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IF NOT A COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC?




In January of 2010, the Supreme Court decided Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission (Citizens United), striking down federal law
regulating the participation of corporations in election campaigns, thereby
allowing for-profit corporations to make essentially unrestricted campaign
expenditures from their general funds.' The source of such payments did not
necessarily have to be disclosed effectively, or in some instances, at all.2 The
Citizens United decision was immediately controversial in the press, 3 among
legal scholars,4 and even with the President in Congress.5 Polls showed
eighty percent of the public disagreeing with the decision.
One might be forgiven for asking why, exactly, is Citizens United so
important?' Surely the general problem of money in U.S. politics is not new,
and both the First Amendment and election law address perennial difficulties
* Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, State University
of New York. A number of people helped me think through this Article, including Dan Greenwood, Fred
Konefsky, Mae Kuykendall, Stuart Lazar, Rick Levy, Marc Miller, Pierre Schlag, Jack Schlegel, and my wife,
Amy Westbrook. I thank Karina Pinch for her excellent research assistance. The mistakes are mine.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,913 (2010).
2 See id at 913-17.
Comment, Citizens United v. FEC: Corporate Political Speech, 124 HARV. L. REv. 75, 80 (2010). See,
e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbies' New Power: Cross Us, and Our Cash Will Bury You, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2010, at Al.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The "Devastating" Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/feb/25/the-devastating-decision/. Dworkin is cited here due to his
alacrity and prominence. The substantial and generally disapproving literature on Citizens United will be cited
throughout the text
s See Robert Barnes, In the Court ofPublic Opinion, No Clear Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2010, at Al;
see also Joan Biskupic, Judicial-Political Friction Causes Sparks to Fl-Supreme Court Observers See Rise in
Tension Between Justices, Elected Leaders, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2011, at 4A.
6 Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship Is Campaign Issue on Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. PosT,
Feb. 18, 2010, at Al5.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Drop in the Bucket, COLUM. L SCH. MAG., Fall 2010, available at
httpi//www.law.columbia.edu/magazine/54665/a-drop-in-the-bucket (suggesting that it is "hardly clear that the
case will have anything like the dire consequences its critics predict").
8 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 1950) (1779) ("[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which
he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical.").
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for a democratic republic. Moreover, it is very difficult to establish a
correlation between money spent and elections won.9 So why has the
Citizens United decision poured so much gasoline on the fire?
What makes Citizens United so disturbing is that the case signals a
rupture in our constitutional tradition. A majority of the Supreme Court
abandoned the traditional understanding of the social geometry of U.S.
political life, in which (i) elections and other democratic processes, (ii)
judicial and other legal processes, and (iii) markets are understood to be
distinct and reinforcing modes of social decision.10 This is no small thing: for
most of its history, the U.S. legal tradition understood the nation to be a
commercial republic, " a society in which political processes, legal
processes, and economic processes are in a tripartite equipoise. What Citizen
United calls into question is whether this idealization of the United States
remains credible.
In failing to recognize (or perhaps understand) the distinctions between
democratic and economic modes of self-governance, the Supreme Court
suggests that this traditional conceptual grammar is losing its plausibility
even among legal elites, a generally conservative group.12 In place of the
tripartite social geometry that defines a commercial republic, the Court
employs a much simpler dualistic model of American public life. In this
view, an undifferentiated society, dominated by its markets, constitutes its
rulers through periodic and formally neutral political processes: elections.
The rulers, in turn, are legally prohibited from direct interference with
electoral processes. Civil society chooses its rulers; the rulers may not
interfere with the processes by which it does so. If enforced, the Court's
dualist vision of society is incompatible with vital aspects of a commercial
republic, including both traditional beliefs about legal discourse and
assumptions that markets are fair. More pointedly, if civil society is
essentially a market society, then we may expect elections to be dominated
by those who speak loudest in markets, the wealthy. If the wealthy elect
9 The influential columnist David Brooks points out that there is often little or no cornlation between
campaign spending and election outcomes. David Brooks, Don't Follow the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010,
at A31. Brooks usually has a better sense for, and more sympathy with, the concems underlying public reaction.
1o For a prescient statement of the problem, see generally Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation ofBusiness
and State, 95 CALIF. L REv. 2353 (2007). Kuhner argues that constitutional jurispnidence could come to see the
relationship between "business" and "state" in the same Madisonian fashion in which the relationship between
church and state, or between the state and federal governments, have long been seen. Id. at 253.
" The leading tradition in opposition might be called willfully agrarian, ranging from Jefferson to the
Agrarian movement at Vanderbilt in the mid-20th Century to various aspects of the counter-culture in the 1970s.
Such visions of what the U.S. polity might mean have never achieved dominance.
12 As the historian J.G.A. Pocock influentially pointed out some years back, political constellations have
lives, with endings. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELUAN MoMENT 84 (1975).
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rulers to serve their interests, we have government by and for the privileged
classes-oligarchy.
Thus, Citizens United implicitly asserts, and may come to stand for, the
proposition that we have become a new, and very different, United States.
The point here is not that money did not use to matter in U.S. politics; money
always matters. At issue is whether there has been a seismic shift in the
ideology or imagination, or normatively the ideals and virtues, that we use to
think through and organize our lives together. The imaginary is hardly
permanent.
There are many ways to confront the possibility that our political
grammar, and perforce, our Constitution, is changing, but this Article takes
the following three interrelated approaches. First, as discussed in Part II
below, the Court's decision, in which the Justices voted along party lines, has
been widely alleged to be "political." In considering such criticism, a very
basic and rather old-fashioned point must be emphasized: the concern is
whether the Court's decision-the process through which the institution
reached its conclusions and issued an order-was "political," using that word
pejoratively, as opposed to "legal." Just suppose, however, as this Article
argues, that such allegations are convincing. Then how is the legal
community, and most particularly, legal scholarship, to respond?
If the presumption of good faith legal argument does not hold, then legal
scholars must find some other way to respond to a Supreme Court case or
move on to other topics. And Supreme Court cases do seem to be important
still, even cases that we may believe to be disingenuous or otherwise
unworthy. Part II of the Article maintains that while we may not be able to
understand opinions as arguments, invitations to open debate in which minds
just might be changed, we may, and indeed must, take Supreme Court
opinions seriously as political expressions, or, to sound anthropological, as
artifacts of power.13 Without rearguing the case, we might ask, what does the
Citizens United decision say about our politics, at least as seen from the very
significant perspective of the Court?
This turn to interpretation-in lieu of argument-brings us to this
Article's second approach to the Citizens United opinion. As has already
been suggested, the decision may come to mark a fundamental shift in the
way the nation's political economy is imagined. In Part III, a close reading of
the majority opinion reveals the dualistic structure of the Court's imagination
of U.S. society. Although useful for thinking about sovereignty, this dualistic
imagination is of little help in thinking through how civil society, including
'3 See generally DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY ETHNOGRAPHY
MATTERS (2008).
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the markets that do so much of our society's work, is constructed.14 The
Court's dualistic imagination of the U.S. political economy may be
contrasted with the imagination traditional in U.S. law, especially
commercial law. In this more nuanced view, our public and economic order
is a commercial republic, in which different modes of interaction (payment,
voting, reasoned argument) define different aspects of public life (markets,
elections, law).
The third approach taken by this Article to Citizens United, and by
extension, to the question of the extent to which it makes sense to consider
the United States in frankly oligarchic terms, is to look at Citizens United as a
case about corporations making payments, that is, in terms of capitalism
rather than elections. Despite the fact that the Citizens United opinions are
preoccupied with the influence of corporations, the opinions pay almost no
direct attention to markets." What little attention is paid to markets by the
Court is grounded on an electoral, as opposed to commercial, understanding
of social participation. That is, the Court displayed little understanding of
how marketplace institutions actually function.
Citizens United has been analyzed, and argued over, almost exclusively
in terms of the First Amendment and of the influence of money upon
elections, which are core issues of democratic politics.' 6 But the traffic
among our political mechanisms flows both ways. What about the influence
of laws upon money, elections upon markets? After all, Citizens United is
explicitly a challenge to laws that regulate corporate behavior, that is, about
the influence of lawmakers on markets. More broadly, the case is significant
not only for how we understand elections, but also for how we understand the
markets that inform so much of American life.
Drawing on very traditional notions of corporate governance, business
practice and regulation, and competition, this Article argues that the
marketplace envisaged by the majority in Citizens United is anything but a
sound market and is, in fact, at odds with the U.S. legal tradition. What
specific aspects of traditional political economy will be displaced or
destroyed? Citizens United concerned payments made by a corporation in
what is sometimes called the "marketplace of ideas." The Court argued, and
the dissent responded, in terms of speech, persons, and elections. But this
14 For much more on thinking about constructed, as opposed to natural, markets, see generally DAVID A.
WESTBROOK, OUT OF CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL MARKETS (2010).
' See infra Part IRB.
1 In light of the posture of the case, the focus on electoral politics rather than sound markets is not too
surprising. The plaintiffs challenged the federal regulation of elections and prevailed on the basis of First
Amendment law's extreme solicitude for political speech. See Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 77,77-78 (2010).
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Article uses language that hews more closely to the facts, and thinks about
this case in frankly capitalist terms. From this perspective, Citizens United
concerns payments, corporations, and markets. Articulating Citizens United
in businesslike fashion allows us to see how profoundly the Court's opinion
diverges from our traditional understandings of how markets should work.
Specifically, Part IV argues that speech by corporations is either inherently
commercial in nature or ultra vires. Part V argues that payments, whether
understood as transfers of value or communications of information, are
regulated in markets all the time. Part VI argues that Citizens United virtually
requires rent-seeking legislation, and hence undermines competition and
sound markets generally.
Such analysis may be a bit wishful, or even eulogistic. Citizens United is
now the law, even if profoundly at odds with other aspects of our law. This
tension within our laws leads this Article to conclude with speculation about
the politics implied by different resolutions. Broadly, the commercial
republic may be revived. It is conceivable that Citizens United will be
undone, and that the republic will honor its electoral and commercial
traditions. The Article mentions several ways that this step backward, as it
were, might be accomplished.
But perhaps the nation will plunge yet deeper into the "democracy"
envisaged by Citizens United. If Citizens United remains the law, then one
should ask whether it is sensible to continue idealizing the United States as a
commercial republic and structuring legal discourse on the basis of
republican virtues. If the United States is frankly acknowledged to be an
oligarchy, then the way we think about law, politics, and indeed economy
should change accordingly, that is, the way cases like Citizens United are
now argued should come to seem quaint, outmoded. By the same token, legal
scholarship should promote a different set of virtues, presumably virtues
more befitting an aristocracy, respect for station, noblesse oblige, a sense of
the importance of glory and gravitas where appropriate, and the like. 17
Perhaps such reassessments of where we are and what is to be desired are
already happening in intellectual quarters more progressive than mine.18 Be
17 If we concede that the United States has become an oligarchy, then legal education might also
change-that is, a mandarin class that serves an aristocracy might have different virtues than a class that serves a
republic, and education should vary accordingly. On the other hand, perhaps the function of the mandarin is
independent of the style of sovereignty, perhaps Sir Kay and Joseph K always meet in the castle. At any rate, such
questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
" One might also try to reinvent corporation law so that corporations, as a locus of privilege, behave more
responsibly than implied by the shareholder-supremacy norm that has dominated academic legal discourse on the
corporation for the past several generations, albeit over the persistent objection of advocates for "stakeholder"
concerns. See David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law Corporate Social Responsibility
After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L REv. 1197, 1199 (2011). Yosifon seems to believe that a corporation more
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that as it may, however, the intellectual and other consequences of such a
change in our political imagination are beyond the scope of this Article,
which is filled with rather old-fashioned notions of American politics and
business.
II. RECEPTION AND RESPONSE
A. Citizens United As a "Political" Decision
Citizens United was immediately, widely, and influentially criticized as
"political." 9 As already mentioned, the word "political" is quite charged in
this context: at issue is whether the Court's decisional processes are founded
in "law" or in something else, presumably the preferences of the Justices. But
"what the judge had for breakfast" is not an adequate basis for the exercise of
power, and in striking down a federal statute and overruling two precedents,
the Citizens United Court-five votes---exercised a lot of power.2 0 So the
claim that the decision is "political" is, in this context, an attack on the
substantive legitimacy of the decision.2'
On the other hand, it is naive to expect judging to be so objective that
ideology, the lens through which the world is perceived, does not play a role.
And if that is correct, it may be expected that the Justices will vote in
patterns, and like-minded judges will tend to vote together, in groups perhaps
called the "conservatives" or "liberals." Those things said, at some point, the
influence of ideology becomes unseemly, and it accordingly becomes more
correct to speak of "politics" or "ideologies," or even "prejudices," rather
than "perspectives" or "interpretive lenses."
To be more specific: Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, along with
Chief Justice Roberts, joined the opinion of the Court, written by Justice
Kennedy, to strike down § 441(b) and overrule Austin and McConnell in the
concerned with stakeholders would ipso facto be more "democratic," but perhaps democratic simply means
virtuous, or perhaps usage is mostly advocacy. It is difficult to see how more responsible collectives should not
more properly be seen on the analogy to feudal manors or perhaps guilds, especially given the primacy that
Yosifon is forced to grant to the board of dirctors-clearly "democracy" is not how business gets done. And
while more virtuous institutions are to be desired, it should be remembered that the interests of the manor are not
coterminous with those of the kingdom. "The corporation and its shareholders stakeholders" is hardly the same
thing as "we the people."
'9 See Abrams, supm note 16, at 78.
20 For a historical perspective on this type of approach to adjudication, see JEROME FRANK, CouRTs ON
TRIAL 161-64 (3d hardcover prtg. 1973).
21 Americans, with their great respect for the law and the Supreme Court in particular, rarely act on their
sometimes genuine feelings that rulings are illegitimate. See James L Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeia & Lester
Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000 Wounds, SelfInflicted or
Othermise?, 33 BRrr. J. POL. SCI. 535,535 (2003).
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22
name of an expansive reading of the requirements of the First Amendment.
All five Justices in the majority were appointed by Republican Presidents.23
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which he supported the majority decision with regard to § 401, but argued
that the Court should go even further and also strike down the Bipartisan
Campaign Financing Reform Act's (BCRA) disclosure requirements as
illegal under the First Amendment.24 Thus, the four members of the Court
conventionally viewed as "conservative," along with Justice Kennedy (the
judge most often understood as the "swing" vote), voted to strike down
substantive aspects of a law duly enacted by the political branches, raising
concerns about the power of unelected judges in our democratic tradition at
least since Marbury v. Madison.25
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined.26 Justice Stevens was appointed by
Gerald Ford (a member of a Republican party very different from today's
Republican party); Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were appointed by
Democratic President Bill Clinton; Justice Sotomayor was appointed by
Democratic President Barack Obama. 27 Thus, the four Justices widely
viewed as relatively liberal, three of whom were appointed by Democratic
Presidents, voted to uphold the challenged provisions of BCRA and the
Court's own precedents. In short, one must strain to see legal objectivity in
lieu of political representation.
To make matters worse, the majority gave every appearance of being
eager to decide the constitutional issues in this case, that is, of being more
interested in extending the First Amendment's protection of corporate
political speech than in deciding the conflict between Citizens United and the
FEC. Citizens United waived its facial challenge to the Constitutional
validity of § 441(b), and maintained only an "as applied" constitutional
challenge, as well as a number of statutory arguments.28 On a bare record, the
majority dispensed with the adequacy of resolving the case on an "as
applied" basis, and held that the waiver of the facial challenge did not
preclude the Court from deciding the case on that basis, so long as the
22 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,886 (2010).
23 Justices Scalia and Kennedy were appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Justice Thomas was appointed
by President George H.W. Bush; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were appointed by President George W.
Bush. Biographies ofCurrentJustices ofthe Supreme Cour, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http//www.supremecourtg
ov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct 10, 2011).
24 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 980 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2s 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
26 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 Biographies ofCurrent Justices ofthe Supreme Court, supra note 23.
28 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892.
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plaintiffs did not abandon their underlying claim that the law was
unconstitutional.2 9 In a similar vein, Citizens United did not challenge Austin
or McConnell until the Supreme Court requested a second argument on the
question of whether these cases should be overruled.30 Nor did the Court
make any effort to decide the case on the statutory, as opposed to
constitutional, grounds presented by Citizens United.3' Nor was the majority
shy about including in its holding unions and for-profit corporations, even
though neither form of organization was before the Court because Citizens
32United was a non-profit corporation.
As the majority opinion tacitly acknowledges, striking down laws duly
enacted by other, democratically elected, branches of government,
enthusiastically overruling rather than distinguishing recent precedent,
encouraging arguments not offered by the appellant, resurrecting arguments
abandoned by the appellant, and generally committing what the dissent calls
"procedural dereliction"33 may raise concerns about the legal, as opposed to
political, quality of a judicial decision. The majority opinion spends pages
arguing the propriety and even necessity of reaching its broad holdings in this
case.34
Whatever one thinks about the merits of Citizens United, the Court's
claim that it had no real alternative to reaching its very broad holdings is
implausible.35 The Supreme Court did not need to grant certiorari in the first
place. Moreover, the Court has any number of doctrines with which decisions
can be avoided (consider political question, ripeness, and justiciability) and
numerous prudential doctrines favoring narrow decisions over broad
decisions.36 Once certiorari was granted, the Court did not have to order the
case reargued. Both parties and amici provided various ways that the Court
could have decided the case in appellant's favor without disturbing precedent
or striking down a law reached after a lengthy and intense legislative
process.37 Thus, with regard both to general canons of judicial prudence and
29 Id. at 892-94.
30 Id. at 893.
' Id at 886-917.
3Id at 886-7.
13 Id at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 886-917.
s See id at 936-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36 The classic citation supporting this proposition is Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
" Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 936-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority opinion goes to great length to
demolish Citizens United's case before deciding for Citizens United. Citizens United, 130 at 886-917. Evidently,
the plaintiffs case had to be destroyed so that the plaintiff could win on gmounds broad enough to satisfy the
majority.
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to the specifics of this case, the Citizens United decision appears enthusiastic,
perhaps even zealous-politicized. The majority had the votes to achieve its
ends, and the facts were serviceable. As the dissent put it: "The only relevant
thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the composition of this
Court. Today's ruling thus strikes at the vitals of stare decisis .... In
effect, the majority argued that years of legislation and Supreme Court
precedents were, on their face, in contradiction with the requirements of the
First Amendment-requirements that suddenly had become obvious, as a
matter of law, at least to those Justices who had been recently appointed and
so had eyes to see.
The sense that the Citizens United decision is driven by political
concerns grows stronger when attention is paid to the majority's substantive
arguments, many of which turn on striking empirical propositions that were
made without any record evidence, perhaps in part because there was a scant
record. 39 For example, the Court justified its decision not to decide the case
on an as applied basis40 by arguing that uncertainty about the extent of First
Amendment protection in different factual settings might "chill" political
speech (in this case, payments) by corporations and others interested in the
outcome of elections. 4 1 According to this logic, as a general rule, courts
should try to decide cases in advance and broadly, lest chilling occur-an
approach rather alien to the common law tradition. Nor was any support
given for the strange claim that corporations would be deterred from their
current behavior by a judicial decision upholding current law (if the FEC
won) or broadening the scope of behavior permissible to 501(c)(4)
institutions (if Citizens United won on the grounds they argued). Most
strangely, the Court simply ignores the easily documented fact-documented
in the legislative history of BCRA and the records of Austin and McConnell,
and evidenced by simply flipping on the television-that campaigns cost
enormous amounts of money, and that much of that money comes from
corporations.4 2 The Court boldly declares what is simply untrue, that
corporations are reluctant to engage in political discourse. As this statement
is demonstrably false, it cannot be surprising that the Court offers no
" Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 The Court rather bizanely claims that the record in this case is not scant because in another case that
considered the facial validity of44Ib, McConnell, the district court compiled an extensive record Id. at 894. That
is, the majority relies on a district court record in another case that upheld the validity of the statute in making its
decision-a case that, moreover, the Court overtums.
40 Id at 916.
SId at 894.
42 Id at 979 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of
this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.").
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evidence for it. What is surprising is that the Court argues from the almost
wacky proposition that corporations do not engage in political discourse.
Indeed, the Court grows impassioned:
The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has
"muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of
the economy." And "the electorate [has been] deprived of information,
knowledge and opinion vital to its function." By suppressing the speech of
manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government
prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests. 43
Apart from being purple prose, this passage is such bad lawyering as to be
professionally irresponsible. There is no evidence whatsoever that any
speech was "censored," in either form or content. In this case, Hillary" was
made and distributed, and the question was whether Citizens United could
pay for its distribution using funds from its treasury.4 5 More generally, the
idea that the U.S. electorate has been deprived of corporate points of view is
literally fantastic.46 Only by defining payment as speech (and speech conveys
information, right?) can the Court characterize any regulation of how and
when and by what sort of organizations such payments are made as
"censorship,"47 which by definition robs the people of politically vital
information because it "muffle[s] voices."48
By the Court's logic, laws regulating direct contributions and prohibiting
the military from conducting campaigns (and even engaging in bribery)
muffle voices, too, presumably depriving the electorate of information such
as the price of a given judge. Recognizing that bribery and other payments
within the political realm still may be forbidden, even though such payments
may be characterized as speech, the Court is forced to invent rather strange
distinctions. So, the Court argues that bribery, or the contribution of money
directly to a campaign, may be regulated because it establishes an appearance
43 Id at 907 (internal citations omitted).
" HLRY: THE MoviE (Citizens United Prods. 2008).
4 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887-88.
4 Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get into This Mess? Observations on the Legitimacy of Citizens
United, 105 Nw. U. L REv. CoLLoQUY 203, 225 (2011) ("Most breathtaking of all is the way in which Justice
Kennedy's third sentence [the claim that corporate expenditures will not create the appearance of comuption] takes
leave of common sense. Recall all those profits ofjust the top 100 of the Fortune 500 companies, and the ratio of
more than six lobbyists for every member of Congress on health care alone. Without a smidgeon of supporting
evidence, Justice Kennedy's third sentence, in effect, asserts that members of Congress will be unaffected by
now-credible threats from those and other lobbyists to spend unlimited sums advertising against their reelection.").
'4 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 907-08.
4 Id. at 907.
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of corruption. But massive expenditures on behalf of a candidate may not be
regulated because there is no "quid pro quo." 4 9 Evidently, the majority
believes that government officials feel obligated to repay contributions and
bribes, but not expenditures and presumably other favors. The Court also
seems to believe that none of this creates even the appearance of corruption.s
Where the evidence for these propositions is, the Court does not say.
Similarly, the Court acknowledges that the law may prohibit members of the
government from engaging in political activity because there is a political
interest in doing so,5 ' which no doubt is true-just as there is a political
interest in regulating the influence of corporate money in campaigns. Again
and again, the Court draws lines, but without providing a convincing
rationale of why the lines are where they are, apart from the obvious fact that
this placement means the case comes out in the preferred fashion, i.e.,
corporate participation in elections is unregulated.
One could easily go on to cite instances of the Court seeming to proclaim
political preferences rather than make relatively objective legal judgments,
but for present purposes, there is no need. The issue here is not whether this
or that argument is tenable. The point is that the reception of a judicial
opinion, like that of any text, is a delicate matter. A parade of implausible
arguments, bald assertions contrary to common experience, and simple
unawareness or blatant disregard of the concerns traditional in legal
discourse, leads the reader to suspect that these arguments are either
incompetent, or more likely, not seriously meant to be persuasive. Such a
reader may adopt a skeptical, even cynical, stance.52
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissenting in large part, albeit concurring in the
decision to preserve certain BCRA disclosure requirements. As he faced
retirement, Justice Stevens worried about the Court: "The path it has taken to
reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution."5 4 In Citizens
49 Id. at 901-02.
s0 Id at 908.
" Id. at 904.
52 Cynicism within the legal profession about the law, or at least the Supreme Court, is likely to be suppressed
by aspiring academics and other ambitious lawyers. So law review articles are still written, arguments made, but
much of this is on a pro forma basis-which is hanily healthy. See The Colbert Report for political comedian
Stephen Colbert's criticism of Justice Thomas and the Citizens United decision. (Comedy Cenrtml television
broadcast Feb. 17, 2011), available at http//www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/
374633/february-17-201 1/jeffrey-leonani.
" "Wrote" is meant literally. Justice Stevens, rather than his law clerks, drafts his own opinions. ARTEMUS
WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAw CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 222-23 (2006).
54 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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United, Justice Stevens thus found himself with the same institutional
concerns, and in the same dissenting position, he had held a few years earlier,
in the case of Bush v. Gore."5 In dissent in that case, Justice Stevens wrote:
"Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the
winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly
clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the
rule of law."5 6
Citizens United soon became "political" in the ordinary partisan sense of
the word. In the President's annual State of the Union Address, which is
attended in person by the Justices, President Obama criticized the Court's
decision.5 7 Using the bully pulpit,58 the President appealed directly to the
other explicitly political branch, Congress, for help in correcting the Court's
substantive errors. The Justices were visibly taken aback: Justice Alito
mouthed "not true."59 This was more than a little disturbing. The judiciary,
after all, is supposed to be somewhat above politics. The Court's authority
rests on this society's respect for law and belief that cases are decided on the
basis of law, objectively, not on the basis of political preference,
subjectively. Or so it has long been believed.
But what if the citizenry loses its "confidence in the judge as an impartial
guardian of the rule of law?" 60 What are citizens to believe that judges do?
Presumably, judges still protect the social order, but in the absence of faith in
the rule of law, the social order is apt to be seen as subjective, partial, and
inevitably unequal. A society in which the citizens believe themselves to be
as unequal before the law as they are in social and economic fact cannot be
called a republic.
B. Difficulties for Theory
It may be difficult for the professoriate to think jurisprudentially about
what considering the Court to be "political" might mean. In some sense, the
" Bush v. Gore, was another 54, conservative vs. liberal, count hands decision, which not incidentally
decided the presidential election of 2000 in favor of George W. Bush. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
56 Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Darlene Superville, Obama Weekly Address VIDEO: President Blasts Supreme Court over Citizens
United Decision, HUFFPOST POLMCS (Jan. 23, 2010, 08:35 AM), httpJ/www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
01/23/obama-weekly-address-vide n 434082.html.
8 "Bully pulpit" is a term attributed to leodore Roosevelt and refers to the President's power to advocate
for a particular agenda. See generally JAMES M. STROCK, THEODORE ROOSEVELT ON LEADERSHIP: EXECurVE
LESSONS FROM THE BULLY PuLPrr (2003).
' David Kirkpatrick, White House v. the Supreme Court, THE CAUCUS (Jan. 28, 2010, 2:11 PM),
http-/thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2Ol0/0l28white-house-v-the-suprem-courtscp=3&sqalito+not+true&st
=nyt
6 Bush, 531 U.S.at 129.
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Court has always been "political." Courts are political institutions. Courts are
inhabited by people, and man, said Aristotle, is a political animal.
Generations of "realist" and then "critical" legal scholars have argued that
the idea that "law" can be understood in isolation from "politics" is an
illusion, and oftentimes a lie, told for ignoble purposes. Surely Justice
Stevens and the host of academics who oppose the decision know these
things, so what does it mean to say that this case is unacceptably political?
Just as there is a sense that Citizens United says something importantly new
about the perennial problem of money in democratic politics, there is a
widespread sense that this case is newly, and wrongly, political. It may be
impossible to state precisely where the line is, but for many commentators,
including Justice Stevens and the other dissenters, Citizens United crossed it.
Although the relationship between "law" and "politics" cannot be stated
with any finality, it seems clear that law must always exist in some relation to
politics, that is, law is distinct from, but not removed from, politics. So, in
U.S. jurisprudence, the majority decision in Lochner v. New York62 stands for
the proposition that an extreme disjunction between law and politics can lead
judges to make decisions that are not responsive to society and are therefore
unwise. More fundamentally, decisions that do not express a society's deeper
convictions cannot claim to be that society's law.
On the other hand, although law must be responsive to politics, few if
any critical legal scholars would argue that courts and legislatures, law and
politics, are simply equivalent. Courts do not pursue the same ends as
legislatures, do not have the same methods or pressures as legislatures, and
are not legitimated in the same ways as legislatures. Few scholars would
dispense with the idea that the judiciary should be in some important sense
independent of both the executive and the legislative branches, and should
make decisions on some relatively objective, professional basis that we
might recognize as legal as opposed to political. The law/politics divide is
dead, but it rules us from the grave.
The majority opinion just does not seem to be serious about law, at least
in the rationalistic sense that law professors use the word. The sheer
sloppiness of the Court's opinion, drafted and signed onto by demonstrably
intelligent people, indicates that the opinion is an exercise, merely going
61 AlUSTOTLE, THE PoUrcs 9 (T.E. Page et al. eds., H. Rackham trans., G. P. Putnam's Sons 1932) (c. 350
B.C.E.).
62 198 U.S. 45, 52-65 (1905).
63 F. W. MAAND, THE FORMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw I (kH. Chaytor & WJ. Whittaker eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1936) (1909) ('The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves.").
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through the motions.64 The majority presumably has reasons for deciding this
case in the way that it did, but the scholar may find herself unable to keep
believing that the opinion is a good faith explanation of those reasons,
presumably because the decision is not, at bottom, legal in character. Citizens
United thus sets forth the conditions for an intellectual rupture, a before and
after, for the U.S. legal academy. If the rupture is felt among a sufficient
portion of the tradition's adherents, then one may speak of a tradition in
crisis.
Whether, as a matter of intellectual sociology or history, the crisis will
eventuate and the faith will be lost remains to be seen. In the abstract,
however, the structure of the crisis is quite straightforward. Just suppose that
a significant number, perhaps most, legal scholars come to believe that the
Citizens United decision is essentially political in nature, that the decision
was reached by counting votes on the bench, not according to the strength of
arguments made at the Court. What are legal scholars to do if this is in fact
the position in which they find themselves? As already suggested, it seems
silly to continue "legal" argument about the cases before the Supreme Court
if the Court has already moved on to doing something else, something that
(old-fashioned) argument does not address. If legal scholars come to believe
that law does not matter much to courts, then how are professors and those
who want to become professors to write law review articles about court
cases?
Perhaps legal argument might be considered a self-sufficient and
high-minded activity, like competitive debate or chamber music, but a fair
portion of the professoriate has traditionally believed that it was responding
to the actual practices of powerful institutions, and that on very good days,
the institutions might listen. It is difficult to imagine contemporary legal
scholarship carried forth for its own sake. In comparison with other forms of
expression, law review articles are simply insufficiently beautiful, true, or
entertaining.
Another possibility would be to take an objective ("empirical") stance
toward the Supreme Court. Indeed the impulse to treat law, which is clearly
an academic discipline concerned with society, as a species of social science
has, in one form or another, run through the U.S. legal tradition since
Langdell. But law never becomes a social science; the legal academy always
pulls back from reinventing itself as a branch of the sociology or economics
6 '"Intellectually irresponsible,' then, remains a fir characterization of Justice Kennedy's opinion."
Polikoff supra note 46, at 225.
65 See, e.g., David S. Law & Davie Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L REv. 1653 (2010).
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departments.6 6 There is no obvious reason to believe that this time will be any
different.
A different approach would be to admit that this particular case, Citizens
United, is indeed an exercise in politics rather than law. From the perspective
of the legal academy, therefore, Citizens United is an outlier that should be
ignored as a professional, methodological matter, thereby neutralizing its
threat to the discipline. One swallow does not a summer make, and the
existence of a few nakedly political cases, like Citizens United or Bush v.
Gore, does not mean that law, as distinct from politics or ideology, does not
govern an enormous number of important social situations. And in such
situations, lawyers (including legal scholars) have something important to
say. Legal scholarship could, in theory, abandon the Supreme Court, at least
with regard to this case. This seems unlikely, especially in light of the
structures of prestige that link the Court to the legal academy.6 And, more
substantively, dismissing Citizens United as an anomalous triumph of
politics over law would leave scholars with nothing to say about Citizens
United. And the case, to say nothing of the issue it addresses-money in
American politics-seems too vitally important to be ignored.
Scholars have handled the un-legal quality of Citizens United by
reasserting the authority of their discipline and railing against the case as
badly decided, arguing that the majority is wrong as a matter of law.69 In this
view, Citizens United is important and should be argued over, but is not
significant for the discipline because it is simply (or not so simply) a
mistake.70 The Court erred, and in the fullness of time, the legal tradition will
rectify its errors. Or so it may be believed. In a related move, scholars have
responded to Citizens United by turning to other areas of law, such as
corporation law7 or securities law, and arguing that appropriate reforms in
such areas could remedy, or at least ameliorate, the damage done by Citizens
United.7 2
6 See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REAuSM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
(Univ. of N.C. Press 1995).
61 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
68 That said, my impression is that Supreme Court discourse has lost some of its prestige in the last few
decades-legal scholarship does not seem as dominated by Articles parsing the Court as it once was.
69 Of course some scholars jump the other way and defend the Court's decision in Citizens United. See, e.g.,
Eugene Volokh, The ChiefBenefciaries ofCitizens United?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 15, 2010, 7:45
PM), http//volokh.comt2Ol0/03/15/the-chief-beneficiaries-of-citizens-united. I suppose this is meant to suggest
originality and independence of thought.
70 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn't Speech, 95 MINN. L REV. 953, 954-55 (2011).
" See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124
HARV. L REv. 83 (2010); Yosifon, supra note 18.
72 Se e.g., Abrams, supra note 16; Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promnoting Efficient
Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L REv. 115 (2009).
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The difficulty with such approaches to Citizens United is their
implausibility and hence forced quality, which undercut their effectiveness.
To respond to Citizens United, of all cases, with a tight argument about an
alleged necessity for widespread reforms in constitutional jurisprudence, or
some doctrinally distinct area of the law, is a quixotic exercise that maybe
only a law professor could love.73 It is certainly true that, reasoning from the
U.S. legal tradition in the fashion we expect of judges, the Supreme Court
answered the question posed by Citizens United about federal election law
incorrectly, i.e., the scholar would have answered the questions posed by the
case differently, if she had been a Justice. But so what? The Court has made it
gin clear that neither the niceties of professorial argument nor even facts pose
serious obstacles to its decisions. To think otherwise is to misunderstand. The
Citizens United majority is not "wrong." As the old joke has it, "We're not
the Supreme Court because we're right. We're right because we're the
Supreme Court."74 Citizens United is the law of the land, at least for now, and
is, as a matter of law, "right."
While devaluing, if not precluding, a certain kind of scholarship-the
kind of scholarship that has traditionally dominated law journals-the belief
that the Supreme Court is not all that serious about legal argument need not
be an intellectual nor even a professional calamity. Legal scholarship might
proceed by entertaining the consequences of the idea that Citizens United is
in fact a "political" decision. In that case, it may be asked, without
embarrassment, what is the nature of the politics at issue?75 Rephrased, to
say that "law is politics,"76 as was famously said in another era, is also to say
that "politics is law" 77-so what are the politics here, and hence for the time
being, what is our law? 78 To put the question in terms of cultural
" See David A. Westbrook, Pierre Schlag, the Critique ofNornnativiy, and the Enchantment of Reason:
Pierre Schlag and the Temple ofBoredom, 57 U. MIAMI L REV. 649,660 (2003).
7 This joke has been attributed to numerous sources. As one variation of it reads, 'We are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
7 Academics of a certain caste could, of course, go a step further, and consider the decision as if it might be
essentially a natural phenomenon to be measured-a proper topic for political science-es opposed to a legal or
intellectual matter to be argued. The question, then, would be to determine whether the decision was best
understood in terms of "law" or of "ideology." See, e.g., Law & Zaring, supra note 65, at 1658 (concluding that
the legal reasons are predominant).
76 John Henry Schlegel, Notes Towardan Intimate, Opinionate4 andAffectionate History of the Conference
on Critical Legal Studes, 36 STAN. L. REv. 391, 411 (1984).
" My friend Jack Schlegel has also said that "politics is law" to me and others.
78 Whatever its weaknesses as an idea of politics writ large, Schmitt's idea of the exception-sovereign is he
who has the ability to declare the exception to the law-has trenchancy here. See generally Carl Schmitt, THE
CONCEPT OF THE POLmCAL (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1932). Given the opposition
between law and politics in Schmitt's schema, the judiciary does not declare the emergency and hence the state of
exception. Without declaring a state of emergency (but see the "vast" censorship, supra note 43) the Supreme
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anthropology: what is the imagination through which the Citizens United
decision makes sense?79
Abandoning the idea that the Court takes legal argument seriously may
work intellectually and even professionally, but it comes at considerable
cost. Politically, if legal argument does not matter, then there is little reason
to see the law as constraining, rather than expressing, social power. The
scholar who sought to influence and participate in legal discourse is forced to
recognize herself as an observer, a spectator rather than a player. If legal
scholars are spectators, then citizens who are not lawyers do not even have
tickets, unless they have some other source of authority such as wealth or
office. Such law is alien rather than republican.
III. POLITICAL ECONOMIES
A. The Political Imagination of the Citizens United Court
To start from familiar ground: Citizens United is widely considered a
"conservative" decision, through which the majority seeks to limit the power
of the state to regulate the political expressions of private actors. Phrased
more negatively, the conservative wing of the Court is unconcerned about the
power of private actors (corporations) to exercise undue influence over
elections and thus government. The Citizens United decision has been
opposed on "liberal" or "progressive" grounds, by people who are worried
that concentrations of wealth may subvert democratic governance (worried
that corporations can buy influence), and who therefore support legal
restrictions on campaign expenditures by corporations."o To generalize, the
Court's majority takes the view that democracy is imperiled by the efforts of
the state to protect itself from criticism. In contrast, the dissent believes that
the aggregation of "private" power poses a more serious threat.
The conservative and liberal positions, the right and the left, are
reciprocal, and therefore share a structure. Both of these perspectives
imagine the social and political world in terms of familiar oppositions:
state/individual, sovereign/society, government/market, left/right,
Court has at various times taken substantial exception to the legal traditions of the United States, perhaps most
famously in Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court tends to deny the significance of its
actions. For example, in this case, the majority actually trots out an originalist understanding of "speech," as if the
Founders intended modem corporations to make electioneering films and pay for their distribution on cable
television. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898-90 (2010). The judiciary is thus a sovereign in denial.
9 See wESTBROOK, supra note 13, at 129-36.
s' See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Democracy and Judicial Review, Will and Reason, Amendment and
Interpretation: A Review ofBarry Friedenan 's THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L 413,442 (2010).
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liberal/conservative. This structure is venerable and runs in the American
constitutional tradition, back through Locke and at least to Hobbes, who
imagined the sovereign standing over and against a relatively unruly private
life, a marketplace. SI In short, this structural opposition between the
government and the market appears in both the Citizens United decision and
in the criticism of that decision, because it is the way we traditionally frame
such questions. As discussed below, although entailed in contemporary First
Amendment jurisprudence, this imagination of our society is too primitive
for legal articulation of traditional American understandings of public life.
B. The Economic Imagination of the Citizens United Court
In over a hundred pages, the five opinions in Citizens United devote very
little attention to what the case might mean for markets, i.e., places where
things are bought and sold. When the Court's attention does turn to markets,
the issue is usually the effect of economic power on the "marketplace of
ideas," that is, on electoral processes. The opinions are concerned with: What
does this or that expenditure of corporate money mean for the conduct of
political campaigns? Does money spent in that fashion serve to justify a
particular regulation, such as BCRA § 203 over electioneering speech, in
light of the First Amendment's solicitude for political speech? But while
asking about the influence of markets on elections, the Court pays almost no
attention to the reverse, the influence of electoral politics-government
power-on the soundness of markets, and our confidence that we are not
living in a corrupt economy. For the Citizens United Court, markets as such
are not really at issue.
In the same vein, at several junctures in the opinions attention is paid to
marketplace actors, notably shareholders and their corporations that are
almost always conceived as if they were voters, whose votes should not be
coerced or distorted.82 That is, shareholders and corporations as such are not
considered by the Citizens United decision. Nor are payments, speech, or
competition considered in terms of the grammar of markets, as opposed to
the grammar of elections.
It is thus only with difficulty and some uncertainty that the Court's
understanding of markets can be articulated. Treading lightly, however, a
few things can be said, particularly since the majority's image of the society
" See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 124-25 (Edwin Curly ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1994) (1651); JOHN
LoCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GovERNMENr 15 (Lewis F. Abbot trans., Indus. Sys. Research 2009) (1689).
82 An exception is Justice Stevens talking about rent-seeking en passant. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct
876, 975, 977 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that must accept its rulings is hardly original, essentially an expansion of the
political imagination philosophically articulated by Locke and Hobbes to
legitimate the state. In this imagination, people come together to form a
commonwealth, headed by a sovereign. Once formed, however, the
sovereign must be regarded as distinct from, and often opposed to, society.
The sovereign has power, perhaps absolute power; the sovereign is leviathan
in its enormity, as Hobbes has it.83
It is the function of law to restrain the sovereign. So taught Locke.8 And
in the United States, it is the office of the judiciary to apply the law to the
government, to keep Leviathan from abusing its power.ss The law, in this
view, heroically opposes the possibility of tyranny." Why, without the
judiciary, the Citizens United Court excitedly exclaimed, the government
might ban Mr. Smith Goes to Washington. Markets fit into this scheme
mostly by implication: because the judiciary's duty is the limitation of
sovereign power, the eyes of the judge are on the other branches of
government.
Broadly speaking, the law restrains the rest of government through the
enforcement of rights, conceived as liberties that the state may not restrict or
take away as a matter of mere political will, and without appropriate ("due")
legal (here especially opposed to "political") process." Among the rights
used to restrain government, however, the First Amendment holds a special
place, because it protects activities at the heart of self-governance, and so the
legitimacy of the government writ large. Specifically, First Amendment
jurisprudence, built on the text that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech,"8 proposes to constrain government
through the dissemination of information, for elections and other matters of
public concern. Congress can make no law keeping people from talking
because talk among the people, and hence information, is necessary for
people to elect good representatives and thus to govern themselves.
All this is familiar. For present purposes, however, what is significant is
that the constitutional prohibition on restricting the freedom of speech
implies some positive idea of civil society, outside the government, whose
membersform the government. Rephrased, "civil society" is the ground from
83 Hence the title of "Leviathan." HOBBES, spra note 81.
88 JOHN LOcKE, Two TREAIsEs OF GoVERNMENT 188 (Hafier Press 1970) (1689).
8s Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-77 (1803).
86 For one depiction, see generally ROBERT BOLT, AMAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962).
87 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 916-17; MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures Corp.
1939).
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89 U.S. CONST. amend. L
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which government springs and the terrain on which government operates.
Civil society is thus the context or field in which government lives.
In limiting the exercise of government power, First Amendment
jurisprudence leaves the field of such exercise, civil society, undefined.
Specifically, First Amendment cases ask the Court to decide whether a given
government action is legal. If the government takes action "abridging the
freedom of speech," then the action cannot be legal because the First
Amendment prohibits government from taking such an action. First
Amendment jurisprudence is thus focused on government action, but implies
a civil society "out there." First Amendment jurisprudence, however, makes
no effort to articulate how that society governs itself apart from the
legislative functions of the government, and what that society's weaknesses
might be. The law worries about the sovereign overstepping its bounds; the
social world that constructs the sovereign, and that the sovereign rules, is
otherwise left to take care of itself.
The brief discussions of economic life in Citizens United are distressing
because the Court seems to have no idea how civil society in the United
States, and especially U.S. markets, actually works, and even more
surprisingly, no sense of the ways in which the government works in various
markets. The short passages in the Citizens United opinion that actually treat
markets read as if written for another time and place, as if in translation.
However, at least four aspects of the way the Court understands
contemporary U.S. markets do emerge:
First, the existence of markets, and their fundamental independence from
the state, is assumed. This is a peculiar assumption in light of the nation's
recent history. The financial crisis has made it unpleasantly obvious that
there is hardly a gulf between the operation of our markets and our
government."o In particular, the financial crisis has made it clear that even a
very laissez faire administration will intervene in markets, with tax dollars,
when confronted with systemic risk. Moreover, massive "public" efforts will
be made to restart "private" markets that have collapsed, including mortgage
securitization and commercial credit. And almost nobody in the United
States believes the federal government ought to be in the business of making
cars, or even evaluating corporate debt. In the United States, market actors
rely on the federal government to get them out of trouble. And the federal
government believes in business, and therefore constructs markets when
necessary. For present purposes, the financial crisis teaches that functioning
markets can neither be assumed nor thought independently of government.
N See generally WEsTBROOK, supra note 14.
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Second, the Court is uninterested in the structure of markets. This is
generally, if crudely, expressed by saying that the inequality of market
participants does not matter, and by forbidding the government to employ an
"antidistortion" rationale for regulating electioneering communication.9' But
of course, the inequality of position matters a great deal in market
interactions, and especially in corporate governance, which is at issue in
Citizens United. For example, a shareholder with enough shares controls the
corporation, and hence takeover battles. More generally, structure matters. 92
Since before Berle and Means wrote in the 1930s, corporation law has been
worried about the relationships among shareholders and managers. Entire
fields of law-consider antitrust, banking, contract, government contracting,
property (especially intellectual property) and securities law-are concerned
with the structure of markets.
Third, transparency exists and can be relied upon. The idea of political
information on which so much First Amendment jurisprudence rests is
strikingly unarticulated. This is intentional. More speech is better, but the
Court explicitly refuses to concern itself with what is said: "[t]hose choices
and assessments, however, are not for the Government to make."94 But
society's access to information is hardly a given. In financial markets, the
principal thrust of securities law is to ensure that quality information is
available to the markets. This is no small task. The financial crisis, to say
nothing of Enron and the accounting scandals that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,95 made it very clear that market actors often do not have
information, and when they do have information, it is often because of a
mandatory disclosure regime. And after the faulty and manipulated
information used to make the case for entering the Second Gulf War, to say
nothing of problems with torture, rendition, habeas corpus, and the like, it
seems bizarre to assume that vital information about either companies or
candidates is simply available. Transparency requires much more than
government non-interference; it often requires regulation. It is thus unsettling
when the Court strikes down a regulation designed to secure the quality of
information and blandly presumes that "transparency enables the electorate
9' See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903-09.
9 See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CTDZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCrION To THE CORPORATION
(2007).
9' See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (William S. Hein & Co. reprt. ed. 1982) (1933); see also Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate
from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Centwy, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 645 (2008).
9 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 917.
9 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages."
Lastly, corporate governance works. "Shareholder objections raised
through the procedures of corporate democracy can be more effective today
because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative."97
Again, the brazenness of such statements indicates a lack of seriousness. The
experience of the last few years is that corporate governance very often does
not work. Companies like Enron and WorldCom lied and then imploded.
The Disney litigation, over the basic competence of its board of directors,
dragged on for years, before eventually arriving at a desultory conclusion.99
Investment houses that had survived for over a century collapsed. 00 After the
painful fiascos of the last few years, it is difficult not to believe that the
Court's position on corporate governance is simply disingenuous. Nobody
could regularly read a major paper written recently and think that
informational systems are working well and therefore companies and
officials in the United States are disciplined by a well-informed and attentive
group of shareholder citizens, who keep a firm hand on the tillers of the
institutions in question. We have the employment and growth rates, and the
entailed pain, to prove otherwise.
C. A Dualist Vision ofSociety
The Citizens United opinion imagines American society to have two
basic socio-political contexts, the state and civil society. The state, including
its judges, governs. The state is periodically created through elections, and
thereby legitimated by the people in civil society. As already suggested, this
is a reductive version of social contract theory, and as such, familiar.
Whatever merits the idea of a social contract may have for thinking about
the legitimacy of the state and its laws, i.e., explaining the bounds of
freedom, such a dualist account of society does not describe our institutions,
9 Id. at 916.
9 Id. (citation omitted).
9 See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
CoMMrrBEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002); KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF
FOOLs (2005); BOB LYKE & MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS 21253, WORLDCOM: THE
ACCOUNTING SCANDAL (2002); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEsr Guys IN THE RooM:
THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
9 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), afd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); Carolyn Berger, Good Faith After Disney: Justice Beger's Closing Discussion, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
659,661(2010/2011).
'* See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. MCDONAlD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS (2009).
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even our governmental institutions, and hence fails to articulate much that is
critical to social life. In the situation that Citizens United, as Plaintiff,
brought before the Court, three fundamentally different modes of political
choice were at issue: elections, courts, and markets-that is, politics, law,
and economics.101 Three importantly different concepts cannot fit into two
boxes without distortion, and much of the sheer awkwardness of the Citizens
United opinion stems from the Court's effort to do so.
However, the majority's dualistic perspective does much to explain the
widely criticized "political" character of the Court's decision.10 2 It is clear
that courts are a part of government: the part of government that serves to
brake the potentially tyrannical ambitions of the more active branches.10 3 So
of course the exercise ofjudicial power is political, and more specifically, the
opinion of a hard-won bipartisan consensus in Congress (hence
"McCain-Feingold") does not count for much-throughout the Citizens
United opinion, the Court simply does not defer to the judgment of Congress.
The explicit command of the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,"'" is taken to mean that the
legislative power of the state cannot be used to shape discourse within civil
society. The two spheres must be kept distinct. In particular, government
cannot use its power to shape elections, that is, how civil society constitutes
government. The First Amendment itself thus not only directly expresses, but
also is used by, the Roberts Court to constitute a dualistic vision of the
American polity.
Consider especially the Court's central argument for overturning BCRA,
McConnell and Austin. The Court begins from the uncontroversial
proposition that the First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, and
specifically, that members of society have the right to speak out come
election time.os From this, the Court takes a giant leap, with a winsome echo
of Equal Protection law, arguing that Congress may not restrict speech based
on the identity of the speaker.'06 From this proposition, the Court reasons that
corporations are legal persons, members of society, and therefore have the
o' See infra Part IILD.
102 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
103 Courts tend to believe that they themselves pose little danger of tyranny. See generally ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS (1962).
* U.S. CoNsT. amend. L
'os Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct 876, 898 (2010) (The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and
to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to
protect it").
1'0 Id. at 898-99. For a discussion of First Amendment jurisprudence in equal protection terms, see Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Two Concepts ofFreedom ofSpeech, 124 HARV. L REV. 143 (20 10).
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right to speak. 107 Because they have the right to speak politically,
corporations have the right to make unlimited campaign expenditures, and
Citizens United cannot be prohibited from paying for the distribution of
Hillary. QED.'os
So stated, the merits of this case seem really quite simple, and much of
the sparring among the opinions is superfluous. If "civil society" is an
undifferentiated mass, then confusing distinctions among various forms of
association (political action committees, § 501(c)(3), § 501(c)(4), §
501(c)(6), and § 527 organizations, unions, C-corporations, "media
corporations," and even "the press" referred to in the Constitution) are
completely irrelevant. Members of civil society have the right to speak on
matters pertaining to elections, society has the right to hear the speech, and
elected officials cannot do anything to influence the speech. None of this is
very complicated, or so the Court argues. Again, the structure of this society
is not really the Court's concern.
The Court does acknowledge a substantial difficulty: the law does
restrict the speech of certain speakers based on their identity, and the
Supreme Court has upheld such restrictions. 109 The law routinely restricts the
First Amendment rights of prisoners, 110 soldiers, "' members of
government, 112 and students. 113 These cases are different, the Court
maintains, because of the "interest in- allowing governmental entities to
perform their functions,"ll4 and because there are "certain governmental
functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of
speech." 5
Here again, the Citizens United Court splits the world in two and does so
at the same place: the line between government and civil society. In the
governmental realm, e.g., prisons, speech may be regulated based on the
identity of the speaker. In civil society, speech may not be so regulated. The
Court provides no authority for declaring a class of "government" First
Amendment cases, but bracketing such quibbles, on what side of the line
' Id. at 899.
1os This extremely simple and explicitly syllogistic construction of Citizens United is the best justification of
the majority opinion of which I am aware. See Dan Schweitzer, Musings on Citizens United- An Appellate
Advocate's Perspective, NAAGAZETE, April 2010, at 4.
'09 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. My argument at this juncture owes a debt to Polikoff, supra note 46, at
205.
110 See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Iabor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 131-32 (1977).
". See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-59 (1974).
I12 See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Lztter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 566-68 (1973).
1 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,682 (1986).
" Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
's Id
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does campaign speech go? The Citizens United Court's dualism means that
campaign speech has to go on one side of the line between the government
and civil society, or the other-there is no middle ground. So framed, the
question is not hard: campaign speech is an act of civil society. "The
corporate [election speech] at issue in this case, however, would not interfere
with governmental functions . . . ."6In fact, "[t]he appearance of influence
or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy."ll 7
Whether this proposition is true is highly controversial." 8 For present
purposes, however, the point is to highlight the dualism that structures the
Court's reasoning. Having bifurcated the world between civil society and
government, it is hardly crazy to suggest that election speech belongs to the
realm of civil society. Campaign speech is an act of civil society; elections
are how civil society chooses its rulers. Elections are not an aspect of
government; they are prior to government. As a corollary, elections are a
function of civil society, which means, at least in a commercial society like
the United States, elections are largely markets.
Three consequences of the Court's dualism are noteworthy. First, as
noted, the structure of First Amendment discourse leaves civil society
undefined. Civil society is the terrain that government (and law) rules; civil
society is the womb from which (democratic) government, and hence law,
springs. Civil society is potential, and consequently undifferentiated. It is
therefore unsurprising that the Citizens United Court has no sense of actual
markets, even if the field of discourse that obtains prior to an election is
traditionally called a "marketplace of ideas."" 9 In particular, the fact that the
Citizens United Court does not consider whether forms of business
association might define both the speaker and the content of the speech, as
noted above and discussed at length below, becomes logical, if hardly
wise.120 Citizens United's silence on institutional matters is not incidental;
this silence seems hardly awkward in the context of the Court's analysis.
By the same token, the Court does not distinguish between speech and
payment, the modes of interaction within civil society, accidentally rendering
116 id
.. Id. at 910.
"8 The Court provides literally no evidence for the proposition. The U.S. Congress, prior Supreme Courts,
and others have thought that massive campaign expenditures create an appearance of corruption, and that
appearance interferes with government functions by undenmining government legitimacy. See id at 961-68
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting Congressional findings to the contrary); Polikoff supra note 46, at 219-20.
"9 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906.
120 So, for example, the Court argues that because the speech of media corporations cannot be regulated, the
speech of no business association can be regulated. Id at 905-06.
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the ancient prohibition of bribery rather inexplicable. In order to preserve the
idea that bribery may be prohibited, the Court is forced to claim the existence
of a vast difference between "expenditure" on behalf of a candidate, and
"contribution" to the candidate. 121 More generally, without distinctions
within civil society between speaking and paying, the Court has no
conceptual ground on which to limit the use of money. It appears to the Court
that, at least if intended to have a political function, payments and other
interactions within civil society must be deemed speech to be protected from
Leviathan, which has some ridiculous but logical consequences, such as the
proposition that bribery ought to be legalized. In response to bribery, as with
regard to speakers whose speech rights are legally restricted, the Court is
forced to improvise, with less than convincing results. In short, the Court's
First Amendment dualism causes it to declare civil society off limits to
serious judicial consideration, and so its ruling appears, if not arbitrary,
hardly well-founded.
A second aspect of the Court's dualism is worth noting here: former
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the author of the Court's opinion in Austin, is
entirely correct to be worried that Citizens United threatens to make
judgeships a commodity, available for purchase.122 From the Court's view,
civil society periodically resigns the social contract and constitutes
government. "Speech"-now understood to be largely if not exclusively the
spending of money-is how the Constitution refers to this process of
building a governing consensus. Judges are indubitably part of the
government, and in much of the United States, are elected. And so it would
seem to follow, as a corollary of the Citizens United opinion, that judges, like
senators, receive their positions through the expression of capital. Why
should the judiciary be different from the legislative or executive branches in
this regard? Civil society constitutes government, and the dominant language
of civil society is payment. It follows that payment should determine who our
officials are, why not include judges?
Thus, third and most critically, the dualism of Citizens United commits
the Court to oligarchy. In the Court's view, "the government" stands in a
reciprocal relationship to "civil society." Civil society elects officials;
officials govern civil society. Government may not tamper with the
' Id. at 908-11.
122 Justice O'Connor worried that the Court was "inching sort of backwards as the money cre[pt] its
way back into the judicial races" and stated that "justice is a special commodity. The more you pay for it,
maybe the less it's worth." Sandra Day O'Connor, Closing Remarks at the Georgetown University Law
Center Forum: Our Courts and Corporate Citizenship (Oct. 2, 2008) in Stephen Kaufman, Contributions
to Judicial Races Worrisome, Justice O'Connor Says (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.america.gov
/st/usg-english/2008/October/20081006101039esnamfuakO. 1795618.html.
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mechanisms of its own creation-preventing such tampering is the central
purpose of the First Amendment. Although the Court does not emphasize the
obvious fact, the United States is a profoundly commercial society. Civil
society is dominated by marketplace interactions. In practice, then, our
government officials are chosen by the privileged classes who speak loudest
in markets, not least through the purchase of the expensive media required to
run a modern campaign. Government is thus constituted by, and presumably
serves the interests of, the economically privileged classes in society-the
definition of oligarchy.
To be clear: the oligarchy that Citizens United announces is not some
version of the venerable argument that every nation falls short of its political
ideals, and that our aspirations to be a democratic republic have always been
compromised by the influence of money. The failure to achieve one's ideals
is perhaps the human condition, but that is not the point here. The point is that
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence law does not operate to create
a body of citizens who participate equally in governance. After Citizens
United, most efforts to restrain or even organize the unequal influence of
money over elections violate the First Amendment. As a majority of the
Roberts Court understands it, the purpose of the First Amendment is to
ensure that civil society is free to choose its rulers in its own image, without
benefit of legislation. 123 If Civil society is essentially commercial,
constructed by the interaction of private interests in markets, then the
government thereby created will serve essentially the wealthy, who speak
loudest in markets. The idea of the republic-the res publica-distinct from
society as a whole (society includes business enterprises, families, individual
interests, and other "private" concerns) is thus lost.
If Citizens United is understood to be a decision written for a commercial
republic (which seems highly unlikely), then the opinion is primitive. The
Court does not employ a vocabulary sophisticated enough to articulate the
relationships among the institutions at issue. Analysis of and prescription for
such relationships is precluded by the Court's bifurcation between
government and civil society. Maybe this is disappointing because a more
nuanced understanding of the institutions of a commercial republic is vital to
the legal heritage of the United States. In this light, the Citizens United
opinion should be regarded as the product of inadequate education.
Alternatively and more plausibly, because it intentionally abandons its
own heritage, the Citizens United opinion might be considered truly radical.
Rather than the fairly complicated imagination of modes of public life that
123 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 ("For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would
suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.").
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this Article calls "a commercial republic," the Court appears to have adopted
a simple dualism, in which an essentially commercial civil society
periodically comes together to choose governors who will protect and serve
society's dominant interests.
At this juncture, it would be useful to be a bit more explicit about the
imagination of politics that I am calling "a commercial republic," an
imagination that the Court either does not understand or has abandoned.12 4
D. The Political Economy of a Commercial Republic
In Citizens United, three mechanisms for the ordering of social life are at
issue: democratically elected representatives (in both the legislative and
executive branches); courts, whose judges are legitimated by societal fealty
to law; and markets, legitimated by a society's use of, and commitment to,
the institutions through which given markets are constructed, minimally
notions of ownership (property) and exchange (contract). In ordinary
American usage and the language of the Court, only the first of these
mechanisms or contexts is called "political." Courts are, or ought to be,
"legal" and markets are "economic." True enough, but it is important to
remember that the structure and operation of our society-our politics in the
more philosophical sense-is composed by the operation and interaction of
these distinct (if not completely independent) social mechanisms.
Understanding that the mechanisms through which so much of social life
is ordered are distinctively different from one another raises questions about
the appropriate relationships among them. For an easy example, one should
neither purchase a jury verdict (that is a crime), nor decide a legal question by
referendum. Purchase is an entirely appropriate, indeed characteristic, mode
of decision in a market, but not in a court. By the same token, aggregating
personal preferences may make perfect sense in an election, but is not how
judges or juries are supposed to decide cases in court. To generalize, the
modes of decision appropriate for one political mechanism are often
inappropriate in another. There are boundaries to consider. Illicitly
transgressing such boundaries we may call corruption, the easiest example of
which is a bribe, i.e., the use of a market mode of decision (purchase) in an
inappropriate setting (such as a court or a legislature).
124 This Article relies upon ideas about capitalist politics, developed in a number of books, to think about
corporate speech genemlly, and the Citzens United decision in particular. Space precludes me from doing more
than sketching these ideas here. For those few so inclined, much more is available in DAVID A. WESTBROOK,
Crry OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL cAPrrAuSM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (2004). See also
WESTBROOK, supra note 14.
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A judicial decision about the participation of economic actors in
democratic processes, like Citizens United, raises questions for each political
mechanism. With regard to law, the Court discusses whether or not it was
justified to hear the case before it so broadly, and to strike down a
democratically legitimated federal statute and its own precedent while doing
125 and6so. Such discussion, and certainly the dissent's objections,12 6 bespeaks
awareness of the institutional danger that the Court will be understood to be
political, which is a danger to the legitimacy of the institution almost as
obvious as the understanding that the Court is essentially a market and that
justice is for sale.
Citizens United obviously raises questions about electoral processes and
legislative power-that is, about "politics." This is a First Amendment case,
and as such, written through the lens of the First Amendment's traditional
concern for political speech-that is, elections. Both the majority and the
dissent treat Citizens United as a case about the influence of money upon
electoral politics and how, if at all, the federal government may
constitutionally address that relation.
But the BCRA regulates corporations; thus, Citizens United also raises
questions about "markets." And if we look at Citizens United through a
capitalist lens, a very different picture of the case emerges. To recall the
forest for the trees, it should be pointed out that Citizens United is in fact
about "corporations" and "payments," in simple senses of the words. Only
with extreme and widely criticized effort does the majority maintain that
corporations are really political actors and payment is really speech. So it
makes sense to think of Citizens United as a case about corporations,
payments, and markets, as well as in terms of citizens, speech, and elections.
If we think of Citizens United in capitalist terms, the majority's decision
is simply wrong, or at least incompatible with very longstanding ideas of how
commerce, and hence this commercial republic, operate. First, as discussed
in Part IV, "Corporations and Other Legal Persons," a corporation's speech
is, as a matter of law, essentially commercial in nature and may be regulated
accordingly.12 7 Moreover, the form of a business association matters. To
understand corporations as speaking for their shareholders is to understand
corporations as partnerships, i.e., not to understand the corporation on its
own terms. (It also gets partnership law wrong.) In practice, the Court's
decision empowers managers at the cost of shareholders. In so doing, the
Citizens United decision almost wordlessly decides, in favor of management,
125 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891-92.
126 Id at 931-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 See discussion infra Part V.
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the fruitful tension between a company's management and its owners that has
animated corporation law through the 20th Century.128
Second, as discussed in Part V, "The Regulation of Payments and
Speech," the government unquestionably has the authority to legislate the
structure and conduct of payments.12 9 Moreover, the government has the
authority to regulate marketplace speech (either natural language or price
signals) and does so ubiquitously. Indeed, the careful establishment of
informational regimes is what the construction of modern markets is all
about. Thus, the Court's key constitutional move, striking down federal law
regulating corporate payments, makes no sense from the perspective of
markets, whatever sense it may make from the perspective of elections.
Third, as discussed in Part VI, "Markets and the Problem of Corruption,"
looking at Citizens United from the perspective of constructing sound
markets raises a question completely unaddressed by the Court: What about
the corruption of markets by legislatures?3 0 Boundaries may be transgressed
in both directions, yet the Citizens United majority only considers (and
generally dismisses) the possibility of elections being corrupted by being
turned into markets.131 The dissent makes passing reference to the possibility
that the Citizens United decision may be bad for business, but the dissenters
are also primarily concerned with the possibility of money corrupting
elections.13 2 The problem of the corruption of markets by politics deserved
more sustained attention.
The logic of Citizens United undermines the construction of sound
markets by encouraging the pursuit of government favorable to the interests
of a given corporation: rent-seeking legislation on a grand scale. The
abolition of campaign expenditure restrictions encourages business to
compete for government favors. Citizens United institutes the economic
logic of a courtier economy: firms will do well if they secure the favor of the
sovereign. In good times, such firms can look forward to contracts and
favorable regulation. In bad times, as demonstrated during the financial
crisis, it is really helpful to have the direct support of the king, who can
provide guarantees, low-cost financing, and sweet liquidity until the storm
passes. Other firms, less favored, will fail or be so weakened that they can be
purchased at bargain prices, perhaps with government financing.13
128 For an account ofthe tension, see BERLE & MEANS, supra note 93. See alw WESTBROOK, supra note 124.
129 See discussion infra Part VL
30 See discussion infra Part VI.
"a Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 90-09.
132 Id. at 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"n See WESmROOK, supra note 14.
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IV. CORPORATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL PERSONS
A. Corporate Speech Is Commercial Speech and May Be Regulated
The Supreme Court erred insofar as it held that Congress cannot regulate
electioneering communications made by for-profit corporations. (Strictly
speaking, that case was not before the Court and so its pronouncements to
that effect might be regarded by subsequent courts as dicta.) In reaching this
conclusion, the Court followed a line of reasoning that is somewhat
plausible, especially for people who do not understand corporation law, but
that does not bear analysis.
Assuming with the Court that the payment at issue in Citizens United
ought to be regarded as "political speech" for First Amendment purposes,
why is it the case that for-profit corporations have First Amendment rights to
make such payments and any effort to regulate such payments is subject to
strict scrutiny? The Court's reasoning begins from the uncontroversial
proposition that individuals have extensive First Amendment rights to
engage in political speech. 134 Forming associations, argues the Court, does
not destroy such rights.13 5 Anything people can say individually they can say
collectively, in groups. Thus the "identity of the speaker"-in this context,
the form of the association-does not matter. The entity in question may be a
not-for-profit, like Citizens United; a for-profit corporation; a union; or
presumably some other form of association. Since associations are composed
of people, an association must have the same speech rights as the people who
compose them. 136 Or so reasoned the Court.
The Court's argument does not hold water. Individuals who join a
commercial enterprise do not thereby give up their rights to engage in
political speech. Most middle class Americans with retirement investments
hold equity, directly or indirectly, and have thus joined a commercial
enterprise-but investors still retain their rights to speak politically. Because
people who join commercial enterprises retain the right to speak as
individuals, the Court's talk of destroying an individual's right to engage in
political speech is misleading. The question is whether an individual's right
to speak is somehow transferred to the association. Not all individual rights
are transferred to associations that the individual joins. Individual rights to
vote and to get married, for example, are not transferred from individuals to
"" Ctizens United, 130 S. Ct at 89-99.
's Id. at 900.
116 Id. at 903-08.
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the business entities that they join (at least not yet).'37 Thus, the fact that an
association is formed does not mean that the association automatically enjoys
all the rights of its members.
What about the right to speak? Is it somehow transferred to associations
of individuals? The "speech" at issue in Citizens United is a payment from
the company's treasury-that is, the disposition of an entity's assets.
Disposing of a company's assets is not something that a shareholder in a
business corporation has a right to do.' 38 The corporation's assets belong to
the corporation,13 9 and management has legal power over the assets under the
ultimate supervision of the board of directors. That is, spending money from
the general treasury is a right the shareholders do not have. Consequently, in
making payments, as a matter of law and not merely practical convenience, it
is simply wrongheaded to say that the corporation is exercising a right
derived from the shareholders.
Corporations also may speak, in a rather more ordinary sense of the term,
in making contracts: that is, companies may use language to obligate the
entity. 140 But shareholders do not speak on behalf of the corporation;
shareholders cannot contract on behalf of the corporation.141 The entire
practice of ensuring that corporate actions are taken by duly authorized
agents of the corporation, in some circumstances requiring a resolution of the
board or even a vote of all the shareholders, entails the proposition that
corporate speech is fundamentally distinct from shareholder speech. Nor are
shareholders responsible for the corporation's speech once made, except
insofar as they have an interest in the corporation. Limited liability means
that the corporation may make commitments, may be unable to make good
on such commitments, and creditors will not be able to seek the assets of the
shareholders.142
The essential point-completely overlooked by the Citizens United
Court-is that the corporation and its shareholders are separate legal entities
'" It is with trembling anticipation that I await the frst marriage between corporations, which will afford the
corporations the privilege of not testifying against one another. A number of mutually suitable matches spring to
mind.
1' Although Citizens United was established as a not-for-profit, the discussion below turns on the nature of
the business corporation. Obviously, had the Citizens United decision been limited to its fiats, this discussion
would be superfluous. But the Citizens United decision by its terms applies to business corporations. Contributors
to Citizens United were business corporations, and political concern is all about the role of business corporations.
13 1 WiLuAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 31 (2003)
14 The powers of the corporation include contracting. I WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAw OF CORPORATIONS § 25 (2003).
11id. at § 29.
142 id at § 20.
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for almost all purposes.143 Special circumstances exist in which the legal
separation between the corporation and its shareholders may be obscured or
erased. But such circumstances tend to prove, rather than disprove, the
general principle that shareholders and their corporations are legally distinct
entities, which do not speak with one voice. So, for example, if a dominant
shareholder abuses the corporate form, a court may "pierce the corporate
veil" and allow creditors to recover against the shareholder, thereby making
the shareholder responsible for the contractual speech of the corporation.'
The point of such cases, however, is that the institution of the corporation is
not respected: the corporation exists only as a sham, and therefore the owner
ought to be liable for the obligations of the business, as in a sole
proprietorship. In general, shareholders qua shareholders simply do not have
a right to spend corporate assets; to contract on behalf of the corporation; or
with the narrow exception of the shareholder derivative suit, to speak for the
corporation. 145 Corporate speech is not shareholder speech, nor is
shareholder speech corporate speech. The Court's argument that the right of
the corporation to speak is derived from the right of the shareholder to speak
is simply wrong.
It is the corporation's managers, but not its shareholders, who make
payments from a corporation's treasury, and who are therefore "speaking." It
is indeed hornbook law that managers (and directors) act on behalf of the
corporation and its shareholders. But this does not mean that the speech of
managers may be equated with that of shareholders, so that managers
exercise the free speech rights of the shareholders-that is, the shareholders'
free speech rights have been transferred to the corporation, which is speaking
for the shareholders. Why not?
First, as a practical matter, shareholders have no easy way of knowing
what managers are saying on their behalf. (In a world of managed funds,
short selling, and high frequency trading, very few shareholders know the
names of all the companies in which they are invested.) The Court dismisses
this objection by noting how good modem information systems are and
noting that discontent shareholders can divest, i.e., the Court assumes a stock
'nId at §25.
'" See, e.g., In re Mass, 178 B.R. 626, 629 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that in the traditional piercing of
the corporate veil case, a creditor or Trustee pierces the corporate veil to reach through the corporation to
reach the assets of the individual shareholders).
145 The limited circumstances of the equitable proceeding of the shareholder derivative suit provide a
partial exception: when the board of directors will not pursue the corporation's rights, a court may hear a
suit brought on behalf of a corporation by a shareholder, a so-called shareholder derivative suit. In this
limited judicial context, the shareholder may be said to speak for the corporation.
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market with contemporary information technology and 19th Century trading
patterns. Again, the Court does not bother to think about how markets work.
Second, managers cannot speak politically on behalf of shareholders for
legal reasons that have nothing to do with whether a manager happens to
have the same political preferences as a shareholder. Managers and directors
are fiduciaries of the shareholders. Fiduciaries act when the beneficiaries of
their actions do not act. The institution of the trust was established to allow a
legally competent person to act even though the beneficiary of the trust (often
a minor, a woman before women were granted the franchise, or a noble
cause) lacked the legal capacity to act. Indeed, the beneficiaries of a trust,
like the shareholders of a corporation, do not have the legal right to control
the assets of the entity. Thus, a manager's speech-insofar as the manager is
speaking with regard to the assets of the entity, as here-is different in kind
from rights of the shareholders to whom she owes fiduciary duties.
Third, managers are required, as a matter of law, to act in the business
interests of the shareholders-a general principle usually taught through the
classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.'" In that case, Henry Ford, who
undeniably dominated the Ford Motor Company's Board of Directors, was
sued by the Dodge brothers, shareholders, for among other things, not issuing
a special dividend, even though the company held large reserves of cash.147
Ford argued in open court that the shareholders had made enough money and
that he, Ford, was more interested in helping American workers by giving
them good jobs (paying above market wages) and American consumers by
giving them good cars, on which he planned to make less money than he
might otherwise.14 8 The Michigan Supreme Court pointedly reminded Ford
that he owed a duty to his shareholders to run a business.14 9
The purpose of for-profit corporations is to carry on profitable
businesses. 15o In the modem corporation, chartered under general
incorporation laws, the idea of the "purpose" for which an institution is
chartered has gotten very broad, and conversely, the doctrine of ultra vires
has gotten very small."' But a for-profit corporation is chartered to carry on a
business for profit, and carrying on a business essentially not for profit would
'4 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
14n Id at 670-7 1.
148 Id. at 671.
149 Id at 683.
"s0 Delaware law, Virginia law, and the Model Business Corporations Act all include provisions to this effect.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 101 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2011, chs. 1-72, 75, 79-92); VA CODE ANN.
§13.1-626 (LEXIS through End of 2011 Regular Session and includes 2011 Sp. S.L, C.1); MODEL BUS. CORP.
Acr §§ 1.40(4), 3.01(a).
" ' But see Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vizes Lives!: A Stakeholder Analysis ofCorporate Illegality (iith Notes on
How Corporate Law Could Reinforce Internaftonal Law Norms), 87 VA. L REv. 1279 (2001).
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be, by definition, beyond the authority of the business. All of which is
tantamount to saying that the activities of a business corporation are, by
virtue of the structure of the corporation, commercial in nature.152 Even if
payments made by a corporation's managers are construed as speech, as in
Citizens United, such speech is by (traditional) law the speech of managers,
made in the commercial interest of shareholders, but not the expressions of
shareholders. If such payments are speech, they are perforce commercial
speech. The Supreme Court has long held that commercial speech may be
regulated 153 without requiring the government to show a "compelling
interest"l 54 under the "strict scrutiny" 15s of the judiciary.
To summarize: payments made by a corporation cannot be the speech of
its shareholders because shareholders do not have the right to dispose of
assets, nor are they liable for the obligations of the corporation. Corporations,
i.e., managers, make payments ("speak") in the interest of the corporation
and its shareholders, but such interest is understood to be, as a matter of law,
essentially commercial, and commercial speech may be regulated.
B. The Form of Business Associations Matters
As suggested by the foregoing analysis, different actors in a business
entity play legally defined roles and what they can do-or "speak"-is
thereby circumscribed in important ways.' 6 Contra the Court, the identity of
the speaker matters a great deal, at least as a matter of the law of business
associations which the Court refused to examine.'5s Specifically, the Court
makes a fundamental conceptual error by treating corporations as if they are
essentially the same as partnerships, entities expressive of their owners, for
which the owners are ultimately responsible (and it gets partnership law
wrong, too). Justice Thomas, discussing Citizens United on the occasion of a
152 Conversely, a shareholder's interest in the corporation is essentially economic as opposed to political, a
general principle taught through Pillsbury v. Honeywell. In that case, a shareholder sought to see shareholder lists
in order to mount a campaign against Honeywell's involvement in the Vietnam War. Honeywell denied Pillsbury
access to the books and records of the company. The court sided with Honeywell; Pillsbury's interest was in
politics, not business. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971).
'" See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). As suggested
infra note 189 and accompanying text, regulated commercial speech is ubiquitous. In a world in which food,
drugs, consumer products, cars, credit cards, investments-i short, the material of consumer society-are all
subject to speech regulation, citing the Supreme Court's occasional concern with advertising is somewhat risible.
'1 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
155 Id
1s6 As suggested above, the Court simply does not consider markets in any detai V-civil society is a mere
placeholder for First Amendment jurisprudence, which is concerned with the limitation of govemment power.
' The Court reasons from media corporations and PACs in a case about not-for-profit corporations to
establish rules that apply to business corporations and unions.
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speech at Stetson University, made at least his own (mis)understanding of the
corporation on the model of partnership explicit:
If 10 of you got together and decided to speak, just as a group, you'd say
you have First Amendment rights to speak and the First Amendment right
of association. If you all then formed a partnership to speak, you'd say we
still have that First Amendment right to speak and of association. But what
if you put yourself in a corporate form? 5
It appears that the Supreme Court does not understand, or at least does
not take seriously, the differences between a partnership and a corporation. A
partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on a business for
profit.159 Although a partnership is a legal entity distinct from its owners,16 0
the partners may speak on behalf of the company-that is, partners may
obligate the partnership. 161 Along the same lines, partners may make
payments out of the company's assets. The partnership and, ultimately, the
other partners are liable for the actions-including speech-of each
partner.16 2 Moreover, partners have rights to participate in management,
and therefore it makes sense to hold the partners ultimately liable for the
company's actions.
Although a general partnership is a legal entity distinguishable from its
owners, the rights and responsibilities of the partnership cannot be sundered
completely from the rights and responsibilities of the owners of the entity:
the partners.1'6 It therefore might make some sense to say of a partnership
that the expressions of the entity should be considered to be the expressions
of the owners of the entity. The institution of partnership thus exemplifies an
association that can, in some sense, be said to speak collectively for its
owners.165
Contra Justice Thomas, however, partnership law hardly justifies the
Court's Citizens United decision. First, on the facts, Citizens United was a
1' Justice Clarence Thomas, Address at Stetson University (Feb. 2, 2010), in Ashby Jones, Justice Thomas
Addresses Citizens United, While Justice Kennedy Ptmls, WALL ST. J. L BLOG (Feb. 4, 2010, 9:26 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2010/004/ustice-thomas-addres-citizens-united-while-justice-kennedy-punts.
"9 UNIF. P'sHIP Acr § 101(6) (1997).
' Id at § 201(a).
161 WLUIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONs § 18 (2003).
261 UNIF. P'sHIP Act § 301.
161 Id.at§401(f).
'6 Id at §§ 305(a), 306(a).
165 Perhaps this traditional notion of partnership has been somewhat obscured by the recent emergence of
many "hybrid" forms of business association, such as limited liability partnerships, limited liability limited
partnerships, and even limited liability companies, as well as the older limited partnership, all of which bear some
of the characteristics both of the traditional general partnership and of the business corporation-hence "hybrid."
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corporation (not a partnership) and, as discussed above, partners are
importantly different from contributors to not-for profit corporations-to say
nothing of the shareholders of for-profit corporations. Second, even if
Citizens United had been structured as a partnership so that one might
conceive that the company spoke for its owners (as in a political action
committee), the company's speech would still be commercial in nature
because partnerships are constructed to carry on a business for profit,166 as a
matter of law, and are therefore subject to regulation. Third, partners owe the
partnership and one another fiduciary duties.' 67 At least traditionally, a
partner in a law firm who used partnership assets for campaign expenditures
without the consent of the partners would be answerable to the partnership.
Interestingly, Citizens United argued that § 441(b) was unconstitutional
as applied to it, because it was in effect a political action committee (PAC),
which is indeed structured so that a group of people may speak with one
political voice to engage in policy advocacy. Contributors to Citizens United
intended to speak politically and collectively.'6 8 This argument was brushed
aside by the Court.16 9
As discussed above, the "speech" at issue in Citizens United in fact was
made by the managers of the company; the shareholders do not have the
power to spend the corporation's money. For good reason, the Court does not
argue that corporate political speech cannot be restricted because managers
enjoy a First Amendment right to speak politically. The central problem in
corporation law, long ago articulated by Berle and Means, is that managers
are continually tempted to take the corporation's assets for their own
purposes. 170 But corporations are not piggy banks for managers. The
manager who uses corporate assets for personal purposes is, in extreme
cases, subject to criminal sanctions. Shareholders or directors may sue
managers who violate their fiduciary duty of loyalty by placing their own
interests, presumably including political alliances, above those of the
corporation and its shareholders, to say nothing of actions for waste or
fraud. 1' More simply still, directors may and should replace such
'" UNIF.P'SHIPAcT§ 101(b).
167 Id.at§404.
'6 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct 876, 891 (2010).
'69 Id. at 891, 897-98 (arguing that the existence of PACs did not cure the constitutional infinnity of BCRA).
170 The locus classicus is BERLE & MEANS, supra note 93.
'. Any number of actions has been brought against the CEOs of companies in recent years. See, e.g., Andrew
Backover & Edward Iwata, Shareholder Lawsuit Says WorldCom Kept $696M in Bad Debt on Books, USA
TODAY, Mar. 18, 2002, at 2B; Ken Belson, Adelphia Prposes to Settle Federal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2004, at C2; Christine Dugas, Tyco Sues Former Chiefaver Self-Serving Ge/s, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at
3B; Edward Iwata, Enron Lawsuits out ofControl, Lawyers Say, USA TODAY, May 10, 2002, at 5B.
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managers.1 72 So, while managers have every right to engage in political
speech, they have no right to use shareholder assets to advance their personal
political agendas.
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)
reinforced this very traditional corporate law thinking. The Act did not
prevent speech in the sense of making or distributing the film Hillary: The
Movie.73 Nor did the Act prevent any individual from making campaign
expenditures. 174 Even collections of individuals could make such
expenditures so long as they did so collectively, by forming a PAC.'7 1 What
the Act did was prohibit managers from spending other people's money to
make campaign expenditures, i.e., the Act addressed an expression of the
central problem of corporate governance, long ago identified by Berle and
Means.17 6 The BCRA was not only about democratic governance; it was also
about corporate governance.7 7 Like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,7
BCRA regulated the role of managers in the operation of corporations.
Sarbanes-Oxley used securities law in an effort to require managers to act
more transparently, perhaps preventing fraud. BCRA used election law to
insist that managers run businesses rather than use shareholder assets to curry
favors.179
Presumably, the Court did not intend to strike down Dodge v. Ford, and
with it over a century of corporate law that understood corporations as
essentially commercial entities. And surely the basic tenet of corporate law
that managers owe duties to shareholders still holds. By the same token, the
172 The Court does not make the truly radical argument that the corporation, as such and as distinct
from people, has a First Amendment right to participate in democratic politics. One might imagine giving
"rights" to living things that are not people, and perhaps one might imagine giving "rights" to institutions
and other things of cultural significance. But the Supreme Court does not do so in this case. For now, at
least, democracy is still about the demos, people.
'" See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
174 See id at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
's Id at 897.
176 See BElLE & MEANS, supra note 93.
'" As a corollary, corporate governance is not unrelated to democratic governance. It is often forgotten that
Berle and Means are very concerned with the concentration of the nation's economic power in the hands of
relatively few managers, who control relatively few, but very large, modem corporations. To put it mildly, such
power has political consequences. See id
.7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
179 This argument should not be taken too far. BCRA only limits managerial ability to make campaign
expenditures within a limited time of an election (60 days) or a primary (30 days), and clearly BCRA was
motivated primarily by concerns for democratic process rather than business integrity. It should be noted,
however, that as a practical matter, the temptation to make such expenditures is higher close to elections, and
therefore limiting the prohibition in time, hardly compromises shareholder protection. Moreover, prohibiting
campaign expenditures for a limited time might be considered less restrictive, and therefore more likely to survive
constitutional challenge, on the analogy of a time, place, and manner restriction.
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Court could not have intended to abolish the notion of management
misappropriation of shareholder assets, at least so long as the assets are used
to advance the political preferences of managers. Thus, unless Citizens
United represents a wholesale revision of corporation law, then payments
made by corporate managers for partisan ends may still be regulated.
V. THE REGULATION OF PAYMENTS AND SPEECH
Whether considered as a transfer of value (payment), or as a
communication (speech), the payments at issue in Citizens United can be
regulated.
A. Payments
Although the Supreme Court treats the payments at issue in Citizens
United as "speech" protected by the First Amendment, it is by no means
obvious that the payments of money in question ought to be deemed
"speech." 8 0 Whether or not the payments are "speech," however, they are
certainly payments, i.e., Citizens United sought to pay cable television
companies to defray the costs of exhibiting Hillary. 181 Government
regulation of politically motivated payments is as old as government itself.
The state may require payments to the state itself-that is, taxes-which are
paid at particular times and places, and in specific manners. Conversely, the
state may prohibit payments to certain political actors, by outlawing bribery.
In either case, the law frankly regulates the payment of money for political
purposes; the state traditionally governs payments as a form of political
regulation.
It is not merely the circumstances of politically motivated payments that
are regulated. The very activity of payment involves the state in sundry ways.
Entire bodies of law, ranging from U.C.C. regulation of commercial paper to
bank and credit card regulation to the prohibition on counterfeit currency
govern how payments are made and with what instruments. More deeply
still, the substance of payment itself-fiat money-is a product of the state.
Money is held and distributed through the elaborately regulated Federal
Reserve System. The exchange value of currency is influenced by monetary
policy. In short, the act of payment is a deeply legal act, and government has
a lot to say about payment.
iso See Hellnan, supra note 70.
' ' Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,887 (2010).
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This is not to deny that the First Amendment may prohibit Congress from
regulating certain payments made for political purposes. Justifying a ban on
congressional action, however, would require an understanding of payments
and the interrelationships among legislatures, markets, and courts. Such an
understanding would have to be considerably more nuanced than equating
payment with speech and reciting the constitutional text. Within the dualist
political economy of the Citizens United decision, however, no such nuance
is possible, and so payment is simply equated with speech.
It is true that price is widely believed to signal-that is, price is believed
to be the way communication happens in-markets, hence the recently
fashionable speech about the informational efficiency of capital markets. 18 2
So, one might argue (the Court does not), that the real "speech" that Citizens
United is concerned with is in fact payment, like payments for the
distribution of Hillary. From this perspective, even if one understands
markets as, like courts and campaigns, political contexts, it might seem that
Citizens United makes perfect sense. In a market, how are decisions made?
Through the price mechanism-that is, the willingness and ability to buy and
sell at a price fixed by negotiation. Thus, it might seem that "speaking" in a
market flows from the capacity to participate in the market-that is, the right
to own property, to sue and be sued, to buy and sell, and to make binding
obligations. Participation in the fluxion of demand sending price signals and
thereby communicating, is what "speaking" means in the context of a
market.183 Corporations are full participants in markets; they can certainly
make payments; therefore, they should be able to pay for the distribution of
Hillary.
By this logic, and as Justice Stevens suggests in dissent, corporations
should be able to vote.184 But corporations do not vote, at least not yet.
Moreover, as we have seen, payment is deeply regulated and could not in fact
function without substantial government action. There simply is no freedom
of payment in any sense like there is a freedom of speech. Why not?
Simply put, payment is not speech. The analogy between money and
speech is so prevalent in the United States that it can be difficult to recall that
money is not speech and that making a payment is not the same thing as
uttering a sentence. Money and words signify and carry meaning in different
1' The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) has been a mainstay of finance for decades. For an
introduction, see BURToN G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY
FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING (10th ed. 2011). ECMH has lost a great deal of credibility in light of unexplained
volatility in the financial markets.
183 Taking the analogy between money and words seriously is one of the signal follies of our era. See
WESBROOK, supra note 124.
'' Ctizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ways.'18 The payment of money signifies, first and foremost, the buyer's
desire for something and willingness to trade a good, money, in order to
obtain that thing. Money is "frozen desire," in James Buchan's apt phrase. 8 6
One may desire many things, some licit, others illicit. The law makes any
number of payments illegal, and regulates how one pays in countless
situations. One may not pay for a slave, and one may pay for drugs or home
mortgages, but only in highly regulated ways. The fact that payments may be
understood expressively (e.g., "I wanted to buy drugs") does not vitiate
regulation of the payment. The scope of payment is far more restricted than
the scope of speech-one may talk about many things that one is legally
prohibited from buying or doing.
It is completely understandable to desire a judicial decision or a statute.
So it may be expected that those with the means may be inclined to pay
bribes or perhaps merely make "expenditures," e.g., campaign advertising,
that benefit certain people in a position to help. From within the logic of
payment, in which the transfer of funds expresses and achieves a desire, there
is nothing wrong with outright bribery, which after all is payment for a
service. Bribery is wrong because we expect more from courts and
legislatures, not more from payment. More generally, it is the function of the
law in a commercial republic to set bounds to markets, to elections, and to the
legal system itself.8 7
The foregoing is not meant to imply that markets do not have moral
codes. They do. We expect market participants to respect the law of the
place, including the laws of contract and property. Indeed, without respect
for property, strong participants could be expected to gratify their desires
through seizure rather than payment. And while we acknowledge desire
("self-interest") in marketplaces (as we must acknowledge personal ambition
in elections), we often expect market participants to employ more than the
"morality of the marketplace," as Justice Cardozo famously called it.' 8 In a
host of situations, business law demands not merely honesty but trust,
loyalty, care for others, and general good faith-fiduciary duties. Even in the
marketplace, more than the logic of payment rules. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that in markets, payment may be regulated.
' See WEsTBROOK, supra note 124, at 39-56.
116 AMES BUCHAN, FROZEN DESIRE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF MONEY (1997).
187 See WESTBROOK, supra note 14 (discussing markets in terms of games, as bounded contexts for
competitive activity).
88 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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B. Speech
In markets, speech is routinely regulated for a number of reasons. Speech
regulation in marketplaces is generally not viewpoint neutral, objective, or
the like. In the same vein, and directly contra Citizens United, marketplace
speech may be regulated based upon the identity of the speaker, and
sometimes the listener.'89 In short, markets are what they are largely because
of speech regulation.
The common law of contracts has long regulated speech under doctrines
of misrepresentation and fraud. A party to a contract who relies upon an
innocent misrepresentation made by the other party and is harmed thereby
has an action for reliance damages. 190 If the misrepresentation was
intentional, i.e., if there was fraud, the injured party may seek consequential
damages and the state may impose criminal sanctions.' 9 1
Moving from common law to regulation, consumer protection laws in
the 20th Century require "truth in advertising."' 92 In many markets, products
are legally required to be labeled. More generally, in many markets,
regulation requires participants in the market to disclose information to
consumers and other market participants. So, for pertinent example, a
corporation or other limited liability entity must disclose the fact that the
owners of the business are not ultimately responsible for the liabilities of the
business. And in Citizens United itself, the Court upheld BCRA requirements
that those making campaign expenditures disclose their identities, even if the
name of a specially established corporation, such as Citizens United, or a
general association, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, conveys little
specific information. 9 The principle, however, is that participation in many,
perhaps most, markets is conditioned upon and shaped by mandatory
disclosure requirements. Speech is mandated all the time.
In constructing markets in which we wish to encourage appropriate risk
taking, speech is regulated. Consider, in this regard, the elaborate and
growing system of disclosures that surrounds consumer lending. Consider
also the information-forcing function of securities law, which is designed not
only to encourage appropriate risk taking by investors, but to facilitate the
sound pricing of capital. When we consider markets as mechanisms of public
choice, it is often the regulation of speech, not the absence of regulation, that
informs the interaction of market participants. Markets are, in this sense, like
"9 Ciizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
'9 RESTATEMEwr (SECOND) OF CONIRACIS § 349 (1981).
' RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 549(1), 549(1) cmt. a (1977).
192 See 15 U.S.C. § 53 (2006).
'9 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
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courts: the information available to the participants is structured by a more or
less elaborate system of legal requirements. Thus, from a capitalist
perspective, the idea that Congress may not regulate a corporation's speech is
very strange.
One might object to this argument by noting that the state may require or
otherwise regulate speech in the commercial context precisely because it is
only the commercial context, not the political context. Speech in markets is
not about establishing the state, re-signing the social contract, and therefore
such speech may be regulated. For the reasons suggested above, the First
Amendment insists that the state may not entrench itself, or extend its reach,
by regulating political speech. 194 The First Amendment, in this view,
prohibits regulation of speech in the realm of "politics," but allows regulation
of speech in the realm of "markets." While plausible in its way, there are
several problems with this "two kingdoms" approach.
First, understanding "politics" as a realm of constitutionally protected
free speech, in contradistinction to markets, where speech may be regulated,
radically understates the importance of markets to our society, and indeed to
our government, and conversely, of government to our markets. One of the
major concerns of government is the establishment and maintenance of
healthy markets, for everything from vegetables to air travel to consumer
finance to microprocessors. The idea that markets are somehow "outside" of
politics in a highly regulated and highly capitalistic society is simply naive.
Second, First Amendment jurisprudence does not in fact take a "two
kingdoms" approach, at least not in any clear-cut fashion. Corporations have
First Amendment rights to speak in markets, so called "commercial
speech."' 95 Voters have more expansive First Amendment rights to speak in
political campaigns, so called "political speech." 196 Thus the First
Amendment applies both to speech in markets and in political campaigns.
The question for First Amendment jurisprudence, at least in a commercial
republic, is the interplay between the modes of social decision, and hence the
structure of speech regulation.
In practice, the "commercial" and the "political" overlap, often by
design. Corporations may mix their sales pitches with a political message.19 7
194 See szpra note 134 and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Sety. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,562 (1980).
196 "Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of
our system of government. As a result, the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech
uttered during a campaign for political ofice." Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2816-17 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"' See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Secrities Regulation, and an Institutional Appmach to the
First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L REv. 613,634 (2006).
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Or business interests may argue that a requirement that the corporation
speak, or a limitation on its speech, is prohibited by the First Amendment as
articulated by the Citizens United Court. Indeed, the Business Roundtable
has challenged proposed Rule 14a- 11, which gives shareholders the right to
nominate directors via the company's annual proxy solicitation, as coerced
speech, in violation of the corporation's right to speak freely. 198 These are
examples of the "train wreck" of First Amendment jurisprudence: there is no
easy way to square the Court's extremely laissez faire attitude toward
"political" speech with the Court's acceptance of marketplaces in which
speech is highly regulated.'99 Indeed, at least conceptually, "[i]f giving and
spending money are always expressive, then all economic regulations risk
impinging on the First Amendment." 20 0
Third, and most problematically at present, Citizens United itself
maintains that marketplace speech is about making government. If corporate
money can be spent in the discretion of a corporation's management,
presumably for the good of the corporation and its shareholders, then there is
no serious distinction between speech in the marketplace and speech on the
campaign trail. It is all about making money. There is no discrete realm of
politics. If civil society is essentially commercial, then it is unclear where the
constitutional power to regulate speech in a commercial context stops, or
why. Or, just as logically, perhaps all speech is political. This is another way
to understand what oligarchy means, which brings us to the next section.
VI. MARKETS AND THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION
As already mentioned, in Citizens United the Supreme Court considers
whether or not "markets" corrupt "elections," specifically, whether corporate
money used to buy advertising unduly influences democratic processes.
From a more thorough-going capitalist perspective, however, which focuses
on corporations rather than citizens, payment rather than speech, and markets
rather than elections, the situation looks quite different. On the facts of the
case, what is Citizens United buying? How are such purchases regulated or
otherwise constrained? How is the market in which Citizens United and
similar entities operate defined? What would constitute a healthy market in
these circumstances? Most obviously, does the influence of political (here
98 Opening Brief of Petitioners Business Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America at 4, Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce v. S.E.C., No. 10-1305 (D.C. 2011), 2011
LEXIS 14988, at *67.
'9 See Siebecker, supra note 197, at 616.
200 Hellman, supra note 70, at 964.
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meaning legislative or especially administrative) power corrupt the operation
of the market?
To understand a market as a mode of social choice implies that the
market can function more or less well; a market, like a court or a legislature,
may perform its work more or less appropriately. A market may be healthy or
it may be unhealthy. During the financial crisis of 2008 and since, numerous
markets were revealed to be profoundly unhealthy, indeed dysfunctional. A
few markets failed outright and ceased operating altogether. Thus, to take a
capitalist perspective is not to cease political critique; it is to ask whether the
market in question is operating as it should.
From a capitalist perspective, purchases of media exposure on behalf of a
candidate are presumably made for self-interested reasons. But what are
Citizens United and similar entities buying? Government has a number of
things to sell, including property and contracts of various sorts-the
government is an enormous economic actor in its own right. In a world of
highly regulated businesses, moreover, the shape of regulation matters. Laws
may be variously enforced. Competitive advantages may be acquired.
Government may also provide security in difficult times, as was copiously
demonstrated during the financial crisis. The varieties of largesse are endless,
but in short, what government does can affect the health of companies, and so
it behooves companies to pay for health care.
None of this is new, in principle, but that does not make it any less
problematic for a capitalist political economy. The problem, for those who
care about healthy markets, is that in general, market actors should be
focused on their business and should attempt to work as effectively as
possible. And in general, in the business tradition of the United States and the
liberal tradition going back through Adam Smith, competition requires
market actors to do a good job, or else face impoverishment. In purchasing
political influence, however, market actors gain an advantage over their
competitors not by building a better mousetrap, but through the "market" in
influence. Among economists, such influence is generally called
"rent-seeking" legislation-that is, it is legislation that conveys an advantage
immune to competitive pressure (called a "rent").20 1
Rent-seeking legislation is presumably in the interest of the corporation's
shareholders. A company that receives a lucrative government contract, a
favorable regulation, a bail-out, or that is allowed to protect a monopoly,
makes more money than the same company would if it did not receive such a
201 "Rent seeking was a term used in the political context by Anne 0. Knieger, The Political Economy ofthe
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). It is also associated with Gordon Tullock, The Welfare
Costs of Tanffs, Monopolies, and Thef, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
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benefit. Companies may decide that they wish to be like Goldman Sachs
rather than like Lehman Brothers. 2 02 Insofar as government action conveys a
rent, however, the government action raises not only corporate profits but
prices, and is thus against the interests of consumers, and of course
competitors.
In some cases, moreover, managers may approach the government for
favors that, when granted, are not shared with the stockholders. For example,
corporate management may be interested to see that corporate governance
reforms, e.g., restrictions on executive compensation, are not enacted, even if
such reforms might be helpful to the owners of the corporation. In that case,
the legislation in question hurts shareholders, too.
To make matters worse, Citizens United fosters a collective action
problem, in which corporations may be economically compelled to make
campaign expenditures, because their competitors have made such
expenditures. Consider whether a player in a highly regulated industry can
afford to ignore a competitor's efforts to curry favor. Rent-seeking is now no
longer discouraged; it may come to be required.203 Ironically enough, in
order to remain "competitive," companies may have to engage in
anti-competitive behavior.
The establishment of a courtier economy breeds cynicism. People may
not wish to enter markets if they believe the fix is in; in such circumstances,
confidence may erode and enterprise may slow. As the sluggish credit
markets and faint demand following the financial crisis have demonstrated
anew, employment, to say nothing of growth, is difficult to achieve when
confidence lags. And sometimes the lack of confidence can be traced to a
belief that markets operate according to rules other than fair and open
competition. Traditionally, therefore, business law has sought to ensure that
markets were perceived to be competitive. Consider, in this regard, the
information forcing and anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws,
especially insider trading law, as well as antitrust law. For much of U.S.
history, investors and consumers have believed that markets were tolerably
fair and open-at least they participated in vast numbers. Perhaps as a result,
U.S. markets have historically operated with great liquidity, widely believed
to aid prosperity.
202 During 2008, at the most dramatic stage of the financial crisis, the government protected Goldman Sachs in
numerous ways, to the tume of billions of dollars. Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail. See Joe Nocera, Lehman
Had to Die, It Seems, So Global Finance Could Live, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 12, 2009, at Al.
203 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 973 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Supplemental
Brief of the Committee for Economic Development as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 3, Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205)).
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It is true that corporations have long been allowed to use money from the
general treasury to support charitable causes, so long as some benefit to the
corporation and its shareholders can be discerned, a principle traditionally
taught through the chestnut A.P. Smith v. Barlow.204 At least since the reign
of Queen Elizabeth I and the passage of the Statute of Charitable Uses, the
Anglo-American legal tradition has encouraged charitable giving-that is,
payments in furtherance of social goods such as the care of the poor and
infirm, education, and the like. 205 At some level of generality, such
expenditures might be understood as both "speech" and "politics."
But charity has traditionally been understood as a virtue, a kind of
selflessness, in principle distinguishable from political ambition. The tax
code attempts to distinguish pure charitable giving, from policy advocacy,
from campaigning for specific candidates. Specifically, the tax treatment of
purely charitable institutions (denominated § 501(c)(3) by the Code) differs
from the treatment of institutions devoted to political advocacy (denominated
§ 501(c)(4) or § 501(c)(6)). 206 (Again, Citizens United was a 501(c)(4)
organization.) 2 07 Purely charitable institutions are tax-exempt, and donations
to them are tax-exempt. 208 A § 501(c)(4) organization is structured for
political purposes-issue advocacy-but may devote some of its revenues to
political campaigns, so long as campaigning is not the primary purpose of the
209organization. Money devoted to political campaigns may be taxable;
contributions to such organizations are not tax exempt. There is much more
to say-election law is complicated, even after Citizens United-but for
present purposes it suffices to note that election law and the tax code have
traditionally avoided, or at least not addressed, the problem of rent-seeking
masquerading as charity. As a practical matter, for the overwhelming
204 A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (NJ. 1953).
205 Charitable Uses Act, 34 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601) (Eng.).
206 IR.C. § 501(c) (2007). Organizations exempt from tax under § 501(cX3) are "[c]orporations, and any
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." By contrast, § 501(cX4)(A) exempts organizations
that are "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to
charitable, educational, or recreational purposes."
207 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,936 (2010).
20' I.RC. § 170(a)(1), (cX2)(D) (2007).
209 R.C. § 501(cX4) (2007); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(cX4)-l(aX2)(ii); see also Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
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majority of charitable institutions-the vast web of not-for-profits that
constitute so much of U.S. civil society-the problem of lobbyists disguised
as saints simply does not arise.
In a capitalist society, markets are key political mechanisms. And like
elections or courts or any other political mechanism, markets have rules that
establish how the mechanism works. Business law has a lot to teach about the
sensible conduct of business relations, that is, about what our rules should be.
And among the oldest lessons of business law is that businesses should be
disciplined by competition, and that businesses will rationally seek to avoid
competition. 21 0 Therefore, the law should oppose the tendency of firms to
seek legal advantage to the detriment of their competition, and ultimately
consumers. Citizens United is wrongly decided because it encourages the
subversion not only of our democracy, but also of our capitalism.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of a commercial republic, Citizens United is simply
wrong. A commercial republic like the United States uses law, understood as
a fairly objective professional discourse at some odds with both democratic
politics (voting) and markets (payment), to set boundaries between and
among various mechanisms of social interaction. At least traditionally, law
has maintained fences.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court tore down fences. The Court's
decision makes it almost impossible to keep the discourse of elections
distinct from the discourse of markets. As numerous commentators, not least
the dissenting Justices, have argued, this is bad for our understanding of
democratic self-governance. What this Article has endeavored to show is that
the Court's blurring of distinctions among modes of social decision,
campaigns, and markets, is bad for sound markets. If we turn our attention
from citizens to corporations, from speech to payment, and from campaigns
or legislatures to markets, the Citizens United decision is impossible to
square with the political economy entailed in the U.S. business law tradition.
As discussed in Part IV, corporate speech is inherently commercial
speech and, therefore, subject to regulation. Moreover, failure to understand
the distinction between shareholders and managers results in shifting undue
power to managers.
As discussed in Part V, the state has the authority to regulate payments.
The state also has the authority to regulate other kinds of speech in markets.
210 ADAM SMrrh, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 122-37 (Edwin Cannan ed., Bantam Classic 2003) (1776).
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In an information economy, the regulation of communication is integral to
the construction of markets.
As discussed in Part VI, keeping managers from becoming lobbyists
makes perfect sense, because lobbying undermines competition and thereby
corrupts markets.
There are a number of ways that the Citizens United decision might be
rolled back, and the nation's commitment to being a commercial republic
reaffirmed. Most elegantly, the Constitution could be amended. 2 11 Several
states have requested Congress to circulate a proposed constitutional
amendment to the states, and a bill was introduced in the House.2 12 But
amending the Constitution is difficult and seems unlikely.
The Supreme Court could in due course overrule Citizens United, or at
least restrict it to its facts, marginalizing the broader holdings as dicta.
Presumably, overturning Citizens United would require new appointees to
the Court. While it might cure some of Citizens United's substantive flaws, a
judicial about-face would hardly help allay the widespread suspicion that the
Court is an essentially partisan institution.
Legislation provides another approach to undoing Citizens United and
achieving the intentions of BCRA. It has been proposed in Congress that
government only contract with firms that limit their political activity.213 This
and a number of similar proposals were incorporated into the Disclose Act,
214
which passed the House in 2010, but stalled in the Senate. After the
Republicans took control of the House, and at least some Democrats appear
to have decided that they should respond by raising more money than the
Republicans,215 the prospects of the Disclose Act appear dim.
State legislatures could amend their corporate law statutes to require
corporations chartered under their law to refrain from political activity.216 It
seems unlikely, however, that states that compete for incorporations would
take such a step, for fear of losing their "business" to other states. Moreover,
211 The novelist and lawyer Scott Tuow has called for a constitutional amendment overruling the Supreme
Court's understanding of corporations as "persons" with the same free speech rights as natural persons. Scott
Turow, Op-Ed., Blagojevich and Legal Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A23.
212 See Dave Homstein, No Shortage of Proposals for Restoring Democracy After the Citizens United
Decision, DETROrr EXAMINER, Feb. 2, 2010.
213 Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Op-Ed., A Hatch Act Reply to the High Court, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 2010,
at Al5.
214 Dan Eggen, Bill on Political Ad Disclosures Falls Short in Senate - Democrats Shy of60 Votes Setbackfor
Bid to Curb Corporate Spendrng, WASH. POST, July 28,2010, at A3.
215 See Manu Raju, Senate Dems Launch 'Super-Pac', PouTICo, (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:47 AM),
http/www.politico.com/newsstories/0211/50010.html.
216 1glslation has been proposed in Iowa, New York, and Wisconsin. See Legislative Proposals Responding
to Citizens United, SouRcEWATcH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Legislative_Proposals_Respo
ndingto Citizens United (last visited Oct 10, 2011).
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the Supreme Court has already signaled that a law prohibiting speech as a
condition of incorporation would be viewed as stripping away inherent rights
to free speech, and therefore unconstitutional.2 17
In a similar vein, corporation law understandings of what boards of
directors do could be expanded and reinforced so that the board of directors
came to understand itself as a politically responsible body.218
The Securities and Exchange Commission could require that listed
corporations disclose their political participation. In general, however, the
SEC has been hesitant to require disclosure of matters that do not impact the
corporation's profitability in fairly direct fashion.219
There are no doubt other ways to mitigate the impact of the Citizens
United decision, but a more fundamental problem presents itself. The
remedies to a bad decision offered here, and the criticism offered through
Parts IV-VI of this Article, crucially depend on the assumption that the
political imagination with which we think through legal problems is the
commercial republic familiar to U.S. business law, in which it makes sense to
distinguish between voting, legal reasoning, and buying.
As discussed in Part III, it is clear that a current majority of the Supreme
Court does not think in such republican terms. Perhaps the Court's change of
heart and mind was inevitable, rather than accidentally bad thought. The
United States is the third most populous nation in the world.220 China, India,
and the European Union, polities of similar or greater size, have more or less
substantial democratic deficits. We are all a long way from Rousseau's
Geneva, where citizens might hope to know one another directly, or perhaps
with a degree of human separation. Communicating with hundreds of
millions requires vast sums of social capital, either money or in some places,
party control. So perhaps it is naive to believe that republican democracy can
be long preserved, and a raucous oligarchy is likely to be preferred to various
forms of more organized authority. From this vantage, maybe the Court's
primitive imagination of our society's structure is to be commended for its
honesty if not its sophistication. Perhaps, as Justice Jackson said when our
constitution was threatened by executive overreaching, our republican
211 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
218 See Yosifon, supra note 18, at 1229; Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 71, at 97-105.
219 Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete
Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. LJ. 13, 29, 61 (2011) (offering a discussion and
bibliography of shifting standards ofmateriality).
220 US. Projected to Remain World's Third Most Populous Country Through 2050, Census Bureau Reports,
U.S. CENsus BUREAU (June 27, 2011), http//www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archivesrintemational_
population/cbl 1-1 16.html.
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"institutions may be destined to pass away." 221 Those things said, Justice
Jackson was right to conclude that "it is the duty of the Court to be last, not
first, to give them up."222
If our republican sensibility in fact passes from the scene-as it evidently
already has for the Citizens United majority-then we should begin assessing
our institutions-and for that matter, educating-in accordance with virtues
more appropriate for a society that celebrates the attainment of privilege over
others. But what would modem aristocracy look like? And how is the United
States, which began by abolishing titles, 22 3 discussing nobility?
221 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,655 (1952).
222 id
223 U.S. CONsT. art. L § 9, cl. 8.
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